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GIVEN the institutional  features  and ethical  norms  of modem labor  mar- 
kets  and  the income-maintenance  programs  of the  welfare  state,  it appears 
that  substantial  macroeconomic  slack  is required  to keep the rate  of wage 
inflation  and therefore  the rate of price inflation  from accelerating.  Be- 
cause  of these  deviations  from  a purely  atomistic,  competitive  labor  mar- 
ket, the unemployment  rate required  to prevent  a rise in wage inflation 
is economically  inefficient.  The central  policy problem,  therefore,  is to 
reduce  this nonaccelerating-inflation  rate  of unemployment  (NAIRU) of 
the  economy. 
The aim of an incomes  policy is to introduce  a direct  restraint  on the 
growth  rate of money wages and salaries,  so that less macroeconomic 
slack  is required  to keep  the inflation  rate  from  accelerating.  Traditionally 
there have been two methods  of implementing  an incomes policy: per- 
suasion and controls. Each has serious shortcomings  as a permanent 
policy. 
A microeconomic  perspective,  however,  leads naturally  to tax incen- 
tives, a new method  of implementing  an incomes policy. A comparison 
with  the environmental  pollution  problem  is instructive.'  Few economists 
seriously  advocate  persuasion  because  in the microeconomic  sphere  it is 
taken as an axiom that each economic agent will pursue  his own self- 
Note:  For comments and discussions on this paper I am grateful to Douglas H. 
Blair, Philip J. Cook, Adrian M. G. Darby, Wilfred J. Ethier, Robert H. Frank, 
Robert P. Imman,  Eitan Muller, Jeffrey M. Perloff, Robert A. Pollak, Sidney Wein- 
traub,  and participants  in the Brookings  Panel. 
1. This analogy is developed in Laurence S. Seidman, "A New Approach to the 
Control of Inflation,"  Challenge, vol. 19 (July/August 1976), pp. 39-43, and Abba 
P.  Lerner, "Stagflation-Its  Cause and Cure," Challenge, vol.  20  (September/ 
October 1977), pp. 14-19. 
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interest.  At the same time, most economists  reject controls-the  use of 
regulatory  quotas for each polluter-as  economically  and administra- 
tively  inefficient.  Instead,  economists  generally  advocate  effluent  taxes to 
"internalize  the  externality"  of pollution. 
Similarly,  the excessive  NAIRU can also  be viewed  as a microeconomic 
problem.  Suppose that the institutional  features and ethical norms of 
modern  labor  markets  and the income-maintenance  programs  of the wel- 
fare state cause the average  individual  firm to raise its rate of wage in- 
crease (relative  to that of the last period) at an unemployment  rate at 
which  the marginal  unemployed  worker  would prefer  work (for a wage 
equal  to his marginal  product) to leisure  or job search.  Then the wage 
behavior  of the firm  imposes  an external  cost on society  in either  of two 
forms.  If monetary  and fiscal policy attempt  to maintain  this unemploy- 
ment  rate, the public "bad"  called accelerating  inflation  is generated.  If 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy accept  a higher  unemployment  rate  to control 
inflation,  the result  is above-optimal  unemployment  and lost output,  the 
value  of which exceeds  the value of leisure  or job search  to the marginal 
unemployed  workers. 
It should  therefore  be natural  for economists  to prescribe  a tax to in- 
ternalize  the externality,  so that each firm  must weigh the social cost of 
raising  the NAIRU when it sets its wage increase.  This is exactly the 
strategy  embodied  in the tax-based  incomes  policy (TIP) suggested  sev- 
eral  years ago by Sidney  Weintraub  and Henry  Wallich.  They proposed 
"to levy a surcharge  on the corporate  profits  tax for firms  granting  wage 
increases  in excess of some guidepost  figure.  If the wage guidepost  were 
5.5 per  cent,  and  a wage  increase  of 7 per  cent  were  granted,  the corporate 
profits  tax for the firm  would rise above  the present  48 per cent by some 
multiple  of the 1.5 per  cent  excess."2 
The proposal  implies  a tax rate t for the ith firm,  as follows: 
(1)  ti = b + m(w - n),  m > O, 
where 
b =  the base tax rate 
w=  the average  wage increase  (percent)  at firm  i, including  executive 
compensation  and fringe  benefits 
n =  the interim  TIP target  for wage  increases  (percent) 
m =  the TIP "multiplier"  (policy  parameter). 
2. Henry C. Wallich and Sidney Weintraub, "A Tax-Based Incomes Policy," 
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Alternative  tax-based  incomes  policies are possible.3  In this paper  the 
acronym  TIP will refer to any of these variants.  A TIP can provide a 
penalty  for a wi above a target,  a reward  for a wi below a threshold,  or 
both (if the threshold  equals the target). It can be continuous,  so that 
the size of the penalty  or reward  varies  directly  with the divergence  from 
the target  or threshold;  or it can be discontinuous  (all or none), so that 
the firm  either  does or does not reach  the target,  thereby  avoiding  a fixed 
penalty or earning  a fixed reward.  The incentive can be aimed at em- 
ployees,  either  in addition  to or in place  of the employer  incentive.  A cen- 
tral  objective  of this paper  will be to compare  alternative  TIPs. 
After  several  years  of dormancy,  the tax-incentive  approach  to incomes 
policy  is emerging  as a major  policy  option.  It has recently  received  atten- 
tion in the press  and  is a topic of concern  among  policymakers.4  A grow- 
ing number of economists have shown their support.5 Despite  this new 
3. A  proposal receiving serious attention is described by Arthur M. Okun in 
"The Great Stagflation Swamp," Chiallenge,  vol. 20  (November/December 1977), 
p.  13, as follows:  "Tax relief for price-wage restraint .  . .  a tax-relief incentive 
should be offered to  workers and businessmen who enlist in a cooperative anti- 
inflationary  effort. To qualify for participation,  a firm would have to pledge, at the 
beginning  of 1978, to hold the average rate of wage increase of its employees below 
6 percent and its average  rate of price increase  below 4 percent (apart from a dollar- 
and-cents pass-through  of any increases in costs of materials and supplies) during 
the course of the year. In return for participation,  employees of the firm would re- 
ceive a tax rebate (generally through  withholding) equal to 1.5 percent  of their wage 
or salary incomes with a ceiling of $225 per person; and the firm would receive a 
S percent rebate on its income tax liabilities on domestic operating  profits." 
An  employee incentive, intended as  a  complement to  the Weintraub-Wallich 
incentive, is analyzed in Laurence S. Seidman, "A Payroll Tax-Credit to Restrain 
Inflation,"  National Tax Journal, vol. 29 (December 1976), pp. 398-412. Modifica- 
tions to TIP are suggested in Lerner, "Stagflation-Its Cause and Cure,"  pp. 14-19. 
An excellent survey of alternative  incentives is given by Michael P. Fogarty, "Fiscal 
Measures and Wage Settlements,"  British Journal of Industrial Relationis,  vol.  11 
(March 1973), pp. 29-65. 
4.  "Another Weapon against Inflation: Tax Policy," Business Week, no. 2503 
(October 3,  1977), pp. 94, 96; "Some New Ideas for Release," New  York Times, 
October 17, 1977; Michael Ruby and others, "Carter's  New Option Play," News- 
week, vol. 90  (November 28, 1977), pp. 91-92; U.S. Congressional  Budget Office, 
Recovery with Inflation (Government Printing Office, July 1977), pp. 39-41;  The 
1977 Midyear  Review of the Economy, Report of the U.S. Joint Economic Commit- 
tee, 95:1 (GPO, 1977), pp. 76-77. 
5. William D. Nordhaus reflected  this sentiment  in "Inflation  Theory and Policy," 
American Economic Review, vol.  66  (May  1976),  p. 64:  "There is probably no 
.  . . ideal anti-inflation  policy, but economists have shown little inventiveness in 
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attention,  only a few serious analyses  have been attempted  within the 
economics  profession.6  There is currently  a large disparity  between  the 
public  interest  devoted  to TIP, and the analysis  provided  by economists. 
This  paper  seeks  to contribute  to closing  this  gap. 
Several  previous  analyses  have  focused  primarily  on the microeconomic 
response of the firm or its employees  (or union).7  A distinctive feature 
of this paper is that it tries to integrate  the microeconomic  analysis  of 
firm  response  with the macroeconomic  impact on inflation  and unem- 
ployment. 
Such integration  is crucial.  TIP is designed  to have a direct  effect on 
the wage decision of the firm.  The logic may appear  to imply that TIP 
depends  crucially  on an exogenous  wage theory of inflation.  Clearly, a 
satisfactory  analysis  must  address  the apparent  conflict  between  that  wage 
view of inflation  that seems to underlie  TIP and the monetary  view of 
inflation  held by many economists,  in which, over the longer run, the 
average  growth  rate  of the money  supply  is a primary  determinant  of the 
inflation  rate. The microeconomic  analysis  of the impact  of TIP on the 
firm  must  be consistent  with  the process  by which  inflation  and  unemploy- 
ment  are  determined  in the  macroeconomy. 
In fact, TIP, the wage  view, and  the flexible  monetary  view of inflation 
are all fully compatible.  If the growth  rate  of the money  supply  influences 
the average  inflation  rate in the long run, the impact of TIP should be 
is an inflation tax which would penalize firms or workers to the extent that they 
deviated from a national norm." 
James Tobin also expressed his concern in "How Dead Is Keynes?" Economic 
Inquiry, vol. 15 (October 1977), p. 467: "The  way out, the only way out, is incomes 
policy. In 1961 the same dilemma ...  inspired the 'guideposts for noninflationary 
price and wage behavior'....  Those guideposts  were advisory. But similar standards 
could be given, if not teeth, at least some carrots and sticks. Use corporate,  personal 
income, and payroll taxes to reward and insure compliant employers and workers, 
and possibly-as  Wallich and Weintraub  independently  proposed-to  penalize vio- 
lators." 
6. An in-depth analysis of the theory and implementation  of TIP is provided by 
Sidney Weintraub,  Capitalism's  Inflation anid  Unemployment  Crisis:  Beyond Alone- 
tarism  and Keynesianism  (Addison-Wesley,  1978). 
7.  Peter Isard, "The Effectiveness  of Using the Tax System to Curb Inflationary 
Collective Bargains: An Analysis of the Wallich-Weintraub  Plan," Journal of Politi- 
cal Economy, vol. 81 (May/June 1973), pp. 729-40; Yehuda Kotowitz and Richard 
Portes, "The 'Tax on Wage Increases': A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 3 (May 1974), pp. 113-32; R. W. Latham and D. A. Peel, "The 
'Tax on Wage Increases' When the Firm is a Monopsonist,"  Journal of Public Eco- 
nomics,  vol. 8 (October 1977), pp. 247-53. Laurence  S. Seidman  305 
to lower  the  NAIRU-enabling the economy  to function  at a lower  unem- 
ployment  rate without causing the inflation  rate to accelerate.  Proper 
monetary  growth  would then be required  to achieve  an average  inflation 
rate  near  zero  over  the longer  run.  From  this  perspective,  contrary  to some 
popular  discussion,  TIP should  not be regarded  as a policy that tries to 
reduce  the inflation  rate permanently,  even in the presence  of excessive 
monetary  growth.  Instead,  it should  be considered  a policy to reduce  the 
NAIRU permanently. 
Nevertheless,  TIP deserves  its description  as an anti-inflation  policy. 
At the NAIRU prior  to TIP-apparently in the 6 percent  range  for the 
United States currently-TIP should cause wage and price inflation  to 
decelerate  gradually,  rather  than remain  constant.  It is true that the de- 
celeration  of inflation  will only be permanent  if the growth  rate of the 
money  supply  is simultaneously  reduced,  and  that a deceleration  of mon- 
etary  growth,  even  without  TIP,  would  eventually  bring  down  the inflation 
rate,  but only at the cost of a prolonged,  deep recession.  TIP, however, 
enables  monetary  policy  to reduce  the inflation  rate  without  imposing  that 
cost. 
TIP also deserves  to be called an anti-inflation  policy in light of the 
political  economy  of inflation  and  unemployment.  Without  TIP, the econ- 
omy is characterized  by an excessive  NAIRU that  entails  significant  hard- 
ship for particular  social groups  in the labor market.  Political pressure 
will therefore  be exerted  on policymakers  to reduce the unemployment 
rate below the excessive  NAIRU in order to reduce  that hardship.  The 
result, however, is gradually  accelerating  inflation.  If TIP succeeds in 
bringing  down the NAIRU, hardship  can be reduced  without  causing  in- 
flation  to accelerate.  With TIP and the lower NAIRU, the economy is 
likely to generate  less inflation,  given political concern for the unem- 
ployed. 
In this paper  I outline a classification  scheme for alternative  TIPs. I 
analyze  the impact  of a TIP imposed  on the employer  (an employer  TIP) 
in a value-maximization  model and also in a collective  bargaining  model. 
The difference  between  a penalty  TIP and a reward  TIP is illuminated.  I 
link this microanalysis  to a macromodel  of wage and price  inflation  and 
analyze  the impact  of TIP on the NATRU  of the economy.  I then com- 
pare  an employee  TIP to an employer  TIP. Next, the welfare  economics 
of TIP is exaniined-its impact  on allocative  efficiency  and  income  distri- 
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A Taxonomy  of Alternative  TIPs 
A TIP can provide  an incentive  for the employer,  the employees,  or 
both at a firm.  It is useful to distinguish  a penalty TIP from a reward 
TIP. Under  a penalty-only  TIP, the employer,  or employees,  are subject 
to a higher  tax rate if wi is greater  than the interim  target;  but if wi is 
less, the tax rate  remains  at the base.  The target  is assumed  to be less than 
what the average  firm  would have granted  without  TIP. Thus, under a 
penalty-only  TIP, ti is given  by equation  1 if wj is greater  than or equal 
to n, but equal  to b if wi is less than  n. Under  a reward-only  TIP, the tax 
rate  would  be given  by 2 below if wi is less than or equal  to g, but would 
equal  b if wi is greater  than  g: 
(2)  ti=b-m(g-wi),  m>  0, 
where  g is the "threshold"  percentage  wage  increase. 
Under a penalty-only  TIP in 1, for wi greater  than or equal to n, a 1 
percentage  point  increase  in wi raises  ti by m. Similarly,  under  a reward- 
only TIP in 2, when w, is less than g, an increase  of 1 percentage  point 
in wi raises ti by m. For a penalty-only  TIP, a 1 point increase  in w1 
raises  the penalty  by m. For a reward-only  TIP, a 1 point increase  in w3 
reduces  the reward  by m. In both cases,  the marginal  tax penalty  OtJ/Owi 
is identical  (equal to m).  Thus, a given marginal tax penalty m can be 
provided  by either  a penalty-only  TIP or a reward-only  TIP. 
An example  will illustrate.  Suppose  that b is 48 percent  and m is 4. 
Under a penalty-only  TIP, assume  n is 6 percent.  If the firm raises wi 
from 6 percent  to 7 percent,  its tax rate  will increase  from 48 percent  to 
52 percent,  or by 4 percentage  points.  Under  a reward-only  TIP, assume  g 
is 8 percent.  If the firm  raises  wi from 6 percent  to 7 percent,  its tax rate 
will increase  from  40 percent  to 44 percent,  or by 4 percentage  points. 
Without  TIP, a 1 point increase  in wi causes a given decline in gross 
(before-tax) profit  7rG and therefore,  for a fixed tax rate, a given decline 
in net (after-tax) profit  7rN.  If an employer  TIP were introduced  (either 
a penalty-only  or a reward-only  TIP),  a 1 point increase  in wi would 
cause  the same decline  in gross  profit  that would occur  without  TIP; but 
because  it also would raise the tax rate, it would cause a greater  decline 
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O7rN/Owj  is called the TIP incentive  effect.  A comparable  TIP incentive 
can be provided  by either a penalty-only  TIP or a reward-only  TIP 
because  it depends  primarily  on m. This can be shown  as follows: 
(3)  7.N  =  (1  -  ti)irG. 
Without  TIP,  because  ti is not a function  of wi, 
(4)  aw-=  (1-b)  -  wia 
With  either  a penalty-only  TIP (ti given by 1) or a reward-only  TIP 
(ti given  by 2): 
(4a)  -wi  =  (1  -  t)  -wi  7r_  1  m. 




-  rN1  (b -  ti)- 
o9r 
M.m 
(5)Wti]V)TIP  Wi  JNO  TIP  awi 
At the w3'  for which O7r6/Owi  is zero, the TIP incentive  effect would 
equal (-7r  m) for both a penalty-only  TIP and a reward-only  TIP. At 
other wi, the TIP incentive effect would still depend primarily  on m, 
whether  TIP was penalty  or reward,  as long as the magnitude  of the sec- 
ond term dominated  the magnitude  of the first term. It will be a con- 
venient  simplification  to regard  the TIP incentive  effect  as primarily  deter- 
mined  by m, the marginal  tax penalty.  The above can be applied  to an 
employee  TIP by simply substituting  employee gross income for gross 
profit,  and  net income  for  net  profit. 
Consider  a TIP for which 1 holds for w,i less than n as well as wi 
greater  than  or equal  to n and  a TIP for which  2 holds for wi greater  than 
g as well as wi less than  or equal  to g. Then  for both these  TIPs, ti is given 
by: 
(6)  t  =B  +  mwi,  m > 0, 
where 
B =  b -  mn for ti given by 1, and 
B =  b -  mg for ti given by 2. 308  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
Under  both, OtJ/Owi  equals  m for all wi. For the TIP given by 1, the 
dividing  line between  penalty  and  reward  (relative  to the base tax rate  b) 
is wi equal  to n. For the TIP given  by 2, the dividing  line is wi equal  to g. 
Although  a TIP given  by 6 for all wi has both a penalty  range  and a re- 
ward  range,  it will be shown  later  that  it is essential  to make  the following 
distinction.  Let w* be the wage increase that the average  firm would 
have granted  in this period  without  TIP. Then if ti(w*)  is greater  than 
b in 6, it will be called penalty-reward  TIP, in that order;  if t4(w*)  is 
less than  or equal  to b, it will be called  reward-penalty  TIP. Because  it is a 
hypothetical  wage increase, w* cannot be known with certainty  either 
before  or after  TIP is enacted.  If it is assumed  that we equals  w0 (where 
wo  is the wage  increase  in the period  preceding  the introduction  of TIP), 
then  TIP can  be identified  as a penalty-reward  TIP depending  on whether 
ti  (w0) is greater  than  b. 
An example  will illustrate.  Suppose an employer  TIP is introduced 
with ti given by equation I  for all wj, and n is 6 percent, so that the 
dividing  line between  penalty  and reward  is 6 percent.  The current  U.S. 
wo  is 8 percent.  If w* is also 8 percent,  this would be a penalty-reward 
TIP. On the other hand, suppose that t,  is given by 2 for all wi and 
g is 8 percent,  so that the dividing  line between  penalty and reward  is 
8 percent.  Then  this  would  be a reward-penalty  TIP. The key issue  is this: 
if the  firm  grants  8 percent-the average  wage  increase  projected  to occur 
without  TIP-would  the tax rate increase  relative  to the base, or would 
it remain  the same or decrease?  I indicate  below why this distinction  is 
of great  importance. 
If tL were given by 6 for all wi, then TIP would be fully continuous. 
At each wi, Ot/lOwi  equals  m. Under a penalty-only  TIP, the incentive 
is only partly  continuous.  For w6 greater  than n, ati/Ow4  equals  m; but 
for wi less than n, Ot4/Owi equals 0. Similarly,  a reward-only  TIP is 
only partly  continuous.  Under an all-or-none  TIP, the incentive  is com- 
pletely discontinuous.  Under an all-or-none,  penalty TIP, t4 is greater 
than b by a fixed  amount  for all wi greater  than n; but t  equals  b for all 
wi less than or equal to n. Under an all-or-none,  reward  TIP, ti is less 
than  b by a fixed  amount  for all wi less than  or equal  to g; but t4  equals  b 
for  all  wi greater  than  g. 
In summary,  two points deserve emphasis.  First, any partly or fully 
continuous  TIP can  provide  the same  incentive  effect,  whether  it is penalty 
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penalty) because  the TIP incentive  effect depends  primarily  on the TIP 
multiplier  m. Either a penalty or a reward  TIP can increase  the loss to 
the employer  or reduce the gain to employees, from a given increase 
in wt. 
Second, any penalty TIP  (penalty-reward,  penalty-only or all-or- 
none) differs  from any reward TIP (reward-penalty,  reward-only,  or 
all-or-none)  as follows. For any penalty  TIP, ti(w*)  is greater  than b; 
for any reward  TIP, ti(w*)  is less than or equal to b. Any penalty  TIP 
would raise the tax rate above the base rate if the average  firm  granted 
the same  w* it would have granted  without  TIP. Any reward  TIP would 
not  raise  the  tax  rate  if the same  we were  granted. 
The employer  TIP proposed  by Weintraub  and  Wallich  is implemented 
through  the income  tax of the firm.  The incentive  could be attempted  on 
another  tax, such as payroll  or sales. It has been suggested  that the wage 
bill in excess  of the guidepost  be disallowed  as a deduction  for the compu- 
tation  of income tax liability  by the firm.  The analysis  below of the em- 
ployer TIP will focus on the income tax, but a brief comparison  with 
other  taxes  will also be given.  The employee  TIP can be implemented  by 
adjusting  withholding  rates. 
I limit  the analysis  to tax incentives  to reduce  wage  and  salary  increases 
(including  executive  compensation  and flinge benefits). Tax incentives 
to reduce  price  increases  are  not examined,  for a number  of reasons. 
First,  the crucial  practical  problem  for the tax incentive  is defining  and 
measuring  the wage or price  increase  of the firm.  For wage increases  this 
is likely to be difficult,  but appears  feasible. For this purpose "wages" 
under TIP mean all types of employee compensation,  including  fringe 
benefits.  It seems  doubtful,  however,  that the average  price  increase  of a 
firm  could be satisfactorily  measured  for tax purposes.  Most firms  make 
products  with a variety  of qualities.  It is extremely  difficult  to distinguish 
a price increase  from a quality increase.  Because the quality problem 
seems much  more serious  for prices  than for wages, it seems sensible  to 
concentrate  on wage incentives.  Second, as will be shown, theory and 
empirical  evidence  strongly  suggest  that price  inflation  will decline auto- 
matically  when  wage  inflation  declines.  Third,  as will be explained  below, 
there  are other  more  practical  ways  to protect  labor, even if no direct  at- 
tempt  were made to restrain  prices.  And fourth,  a price target  for indi- 
vidual firms  is less defensible  than a wage target.  The variance  of wage 
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because  the former  is limited  by labor  mobility  across  firms,  and  perhaps 
by conceptions  of equity. Different  growth  rates of productivity  across 
firms  cause  a larger  variance  in unit cost increases,  and  therefore  in price 
increases. 
Finally,  a nontax  permit  form of wage incentive  such as Lerner  sug- 
gests should be noted.8  According  to this plan, the government  would 
fix the number  of wage permits  and let employers  bid for permits,  with 
price  set by supply  and  demand.  While  appealing  in theory,  the practical 
aspects  of the permit  proposal  would require  careful scrutiny.  For ex- 
ample,  the impact  of precautionary  and  speculative  motives  on the permit 
market  would have to be assessed. Even if these practical difficulties 
prove  decisive,  the wage permit  proposal  is a close intellectual  cousin  of 
the  tax  incentive,  and  helps  illuminate  the underlying  logic of the incentive 
approach. 
The  Impact  of TIP  in a Value-Maximization  Model 
I now  turn  to an analysis  of the impact  of an employer  TIP on the opti- 
mum  wage increase  of the firm.  The firm  is assumed  to be a monopso- 
nistic  competitor  in its labor  market,  confronting  an upward-sloping  labor 
supply  curve;  and  a monopolistic  competitor  in its product  market,  facing 
a downward-sloping  demand  curve. Initially,  nonunion  wages are con- 
sidered  (collective  bargaining  will be discussed  below). 
In this model, the objective  of management  at firm  i is to choose the 
wage  that  maximizes  the present  value of the firm.  Given  the wage of the 
last period,  the choice of the optimum  wage is equivalent  to the choice 
of the optimum  percentage  wage increase for this period. Throughout 
this  paper  the choice  variable  will be wi, the percentage  wage  increase. 
The value-maximization  model is presented  in detail in the appendix. 
Here, its main features  will be summarized.  The model has two objec- 
tives: to contrast  a penalty  TIP with a reward  TIP and to explain  why 
a penalty  TIP should  be able to reduce  the firm's  wage increase  without 
causing  an actual  rise in its tax rate or an actual  squeeze  in its after-tax 
profit. 
The key features  of the value-maximization  model, in which  manage- 
ment considers  future as well as current  net profit, can best be appre- 
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ciated  by first  considering  a myopic  profit-maximization  model, in which 
management  considers  only current  net profit.  The main implication  of 
the myopic  model is that the incentive  to reduce  wi under  a penalty  TIP 
and a reward  TIP with the same TIP multiplier  would be identical. 
For a monopsonistic-monopolistic  firm  there is a wi' that maximizes 
current  gross  profit;  if the firm  granted  a lower wi, the reduction  in labor 
supply  and  output  would  outweigh  the lower  wage  per man-hour,  thereby 
reducing  current  gross  profit.  If the tax rate  of the firm  were independent 
of wi, the same  wi' would also maximize  current  net profit (according  to 
4).  In the myopic model, management  chooses this wi'-so  that both 
O7rG/Owi  and  OzrN/Ow  are  zero. 
If either  a penalty  TIP or a reward  TIP were introduced  with a given 
m, 07r/lwi  would still be zero at wi'; but O2rN/Owi  would now be nega- 
tive and  equal  to (--xG i  m), as shown  in 4a. A reduction  in wi still  would 
not raise  gross  profit  at wi'; but it would  now raise  net profit  by reducing 
the tax rate ti, which  TIP makes  a function  of wj. The magnitude  of the 
incentive to reduce wi,  measured by  (-  m  m),  depends on m  and is 
the same  whether  TIP has a penalty  or a reward.  Moreover,  the new opti- 
mum  under  TIP, wi", would also depend  primarily  on m. According  to 
4a, w/" would occur  where  the loss in gross profit  from a further  decre- 
ment  in wi exactly  offsets  the reduction  in ti, so that there  would be no 
further  increase  in net  profit. 
The myopic model therefore  implies that TIP would reduce wi. But 
it would also reduce  employment  because  a lower  wage corresponds  to a 
lower supply of labor. Furthermore,  the myopic model implies that a 
penalty  TIP that would severely  squeeze  net profit  if the firm  remained 
at w1'  would provide  no stronger  incentive  to reduce wi than a reward 
TIP. The reason is that there is no slack with respect to current  net 
profit  in the myopic model. Without  TIP, the wi' is chosen that would 
maximize  current  gross  profit,  and  therefore  net profit.  If a profit  squeeze 
threatened,  management  might  not be able to reduce  wi in order  to raise 
gross profit.  Without  TIP, if a decline in product  demand  threatened  to 
squeeze  net profit,  management  might  still choose the same wi' because 
that  choice  might  still  maximize  net  profit. 
This feature  of the myopic  model is counter  to intuition,  which  would 
lead the analyst  to believe  that,  in response  to a potential  squeeze  in cur- 
rent net profit,  management  would choose a smaller  wi and this would, 
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maximization  model  is presented  below  that  embodies  the above  intuition, 
and predicts  that a penalty  TIP probably  will provide  a stronger  incen- 
tive  to reduce  w4  than  a reward  TIP with  the same  m. 
In the myopic model, management  chooses the wi that maximizes 
current  net profit. In contrast,  management  in the value-maximization 
model  finds  it optimal  to grant  a wi above  the level that would  maximize 
current  net profit  because  a larger  wage  increase  is regarded  as an invest- 
ment  in personnel  policy: it contributes  to employee  satisfaction  with the 
firm, and this is expected to reduce future quit rates, recruitment  and 
training  costs, and therefore  to increase  future  net profits.  The firm  oper- 
ates to the left of its labor  supply  curve  at the wage  increase  it grants.  To 
maximize  present  value, it is optimal  for management  to sacrifice  some 
current  profit  in order  to raise  future  net profit  through  an investment  in 
personnel  policy. 
This means  that,  beginning  at the optimum  wage  increase,  the firm  has 
the ability  to raise  current  net profit  by reducing  its wage increase;  there 
is slack  with respect  to current  net profit.  Moreover,  the firm  can accom- 
plish  this  without  reducing  employment. 
The second key assumption  of the value-maximization  model is that 
if the level of current  net profit  declines, an increment  of net profit  will 
become more valuable relative to an increment  of investment  in per- 
sonnel policy. In response to a threatened  squeeze in the level of net 
profit,  management  will therefore  find  it optimal  to reduce  wi and there- 
fore its investment  in personnel  policy  in order  to raise  current  net profit. 
This change  in the marginal  rate of substitution  between current  net 
profit  and  personnel  investment  when  current  net profit  declines  seems  in- 
tuitively  plausible.  It would occur, by definition  of the marginal  rate of 
substitution,  if the impact  of an increment  of net profit  on the value of the 
firm  increases  proportionally  more than the impact of an increment  of 
personnel  investment  on the value of the firm  when current  net profit 
declines.  This  is likely  to be the case through  effects  on the cost of capital. 
The firm's  cost of capital from retained  earnings  is generally  viewed 
as less than  the cost from  external  borrowing  (which,  in turn,  is less than 
the cost from  new equity). Consider  a firm  with current  net profit  larger 
than planned  investment,  so that it can finance  its investment  from re- 
tained  earnings.  If its current  net profit  declined,  at first  there  would be 
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however,  it would  be forced  to finance  its investment  partly  from  external 
borrowing,  thereby  raising  its cost  of capital. 
Moreover,  it seems  plausible  that each decrement  of current  net profit 
will cause a larger  increment  in the cost of external  borrowing.  Beyond 
some  point,  a decrement  of net profit  will probably  raise  the risk  premium 
imputed  by creditors  and included  in the cost of external  borrowing;  and 
each successive  decrement  may cause a larger  increment  in the risk pre- 
mium  as  the  prospect  of loan  default  becomes  greater. 
Thus, once current  net profit  declines  beyond some point, each suc- 
cessive  decrement  in current  net profit  will cause  a larger  increment  in the 
cost of capital.  Conversely,  if the firm  is at a low, rather  than  a high,  level 
of current  net profit  (relative  to its investment  options), an increment  of 
current  net profit  should cause a larger  decrement  in the cost of capital 
and  thus  yield  a greater  increment  in firm  value. 
The personal  incentives  of management  may also change  the marginal 
rate  of substitution  in favor  of current  net profit  when  the level of current 
net  profit  declines.  Suppose  management  believed  that  the board  of direc- 
tors (and perhaps  also the stockholders)  regarded  current  net profit  as a 
tangible  indicator  of the competence  of management.  Thus, current  net 
profit  may serve as a signal  when there is a disparity  in information  be- 
tween  management  and the board (and perhaps  stockholders).  As long 
as the firm's  current  net profit  rate  is "normal,"  it will be optimal  for man- 
agement  to undertake  any  investment-such as one in personnel  policy- 
that  is expected  to raise  the value of the firm.  If the level of net profit  de- 
clines  significantly  below  normal,  however,  it may  be optimal  for manage- 
ment  to sacrifice  some  investment  in personnel  policy to raise current  net 
profit  in order  to protect  its own  position. 
If the two key assumptions  of the value-maximization  model are cor- 
rect, a penalty  TIP would almost certainly  provide  a stronger  incentive 
to reduce  wi than a reward  TIP with the same TIP multiplier  m. Both 
a penalty  TIP and a reward  TIP raise the absolute  value of  7r5/Owj by 
an amount  that depends primarily  on m. But according  to the value- 
maximization  model, there  is also an income  effect.  This means  that if a 
current  net profit  squeeze  were threatened  by a penalty  TIP, in contrast 
to a reward  TIP, management  would  have the ability,  and  find  it optimal, 
to reduce  wj in an attempt  to mitigate  the decline in current  net profit. 
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use both the substitution  and the income effects  to provide  an incentive 
to reduce  wi; in contrast,  a reward  TIP would rely solely on the substi- 
tution  effect. 
The central  feature  of the value-maximization  model-that  the level 
of current  net profit influences  the size of the wage increase-is  sup- 
ported  by econometric  evidence.  Table 1 presents  econometric  estimates 
for a wage  equation  from  a time  series  of U.S. manufacturing.  By abstract- 
ing from  the distributed  lags in that  fitted  equation,  its basic form can be 
represented  as: 
(7)  wt  =r  (U  Ut)  +z  (  )  +  wt-1,  r >  O,  z >  0, 
where 
w  growth  rate of money  wages 
U  unemployment rate 
=  Nnet  profit  rate 
U, jj2  -parameters  of the economy. 
The equations  in table 1 differ solely according  to the adjusted  un- 
employment  rate variable  used. The t statistic  for the profit  variable  ex- 
ceeds four in all three equations.  A special test suggested  by J. Durbin 
for equations  with lagged right-hand  dependent  variables  indicates  that 
the probability  of autocorrelation,  with its serious  econometric  implica- 
tions  when  wt-i is on the right,  fortunately  is low in these  equations.  More 
detailed  analysis  of these and related  wage equations  is presented  else- 
where.9  The result  for the profit  variable  is important  for choosing  be- 
tween a penalty  and a reward  TIP, and further  econometric  research  on 
it should  receive  high  priority. 
The second  important  conclusion  provided  by the value-maximization 
model is that, although  a penalty  TIP threatens  a net profit squeeze if 
the firm  fails to reduce  wj, it need not cause an actual  net profit  squeeze 
if the TIP multiplier  m is set at the proper magnitude.  That result is 
demonstrated  in the appendix;  here,  the argument  will be summarized. 
At each wi, TIP causes  a larger  decrement  in net profit  as a result  of a 
given  increment  in wages  because  the TIP incentive  effect  makes  the tax 
rate vary directly  with wi. Let wj* be the optimum  without TIP, and 
9. Laurence S. Seidman, 'The Return of the Profit Rate to the Wage Equation," 
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Table  1. Wage  Equations  for U.S. Manufacturing,  Quarterly,  1955:2-1975:2a 
Independent  variableb  Regression  statistic 
Profit  Unemployment  Standard  Durbin- 
Equiation  Constant  measure  measure?  Wtii  a  error  Watson 
1.1  -5.58  5.58  2.00  0.94  0.73  1.21  2.03 
(-4.08)  (4.19)  (1.45)  (8.58) 
1.2  -6.26  6.10  3.24  0.94  0.73  1.20  2.08 
(-4.43)  (4.26)  (1.23)  (8.82) 
1.3  -6.60  6.12  6.07  0.88  0.74  1.18  2.11 
(-4.71)  (4.43)  (2.00)  (8.06) 
Sources: The dependent variable, the rate of change in the hourly earnings index, and data on unem- 
ployment rates were provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The profit variable, 7rt-i, is the ratio 
of the actual after-tax profit rate on equity to the normal profit rate for that quarter, estimated as a linear 
trend, and is from U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Quarterly  Finiancial  Report  for Manufacturing,  Mining 
and Trade  Corporations,  various issues. 
a. All regressions were estimated using the technique of ordinary least squares. The numbers in paren- 
theses are t statistics. 
b. Each variable is a polynomial-distributed  lag of second degree; rt-i  and Ul-, are lagged four quar- 
ters, beginning'in t -  I (constrained  to zero in the fifth quarter),  while w_i-  is lagged twelve quarters  (con- 
strained to zero in the thirteenth). The coefficient shown for each variable is the sum of the individual 
lag coefficients,  and the t statistic applies to the sum. 
c.  Equation 1.1 uses the inverse of the unemployment rate for prime-age males; 1.2 uses the inverse of 
the weighted unemployment rate described  in George L. Perry, "Changing  Labor Markets and Inflation," 
BPEA, 3:1970, pp. 415-16; and 1.3 uses UGAP, described  in Michael L. Wachter, "The Changing Cyclical 
Responsiveness of Wage Inflation," BPEA, 1:1976, pp. 125-33. 
w**  be the optimum  under  a penalty  TIP (w1* greater  than w**).  At 
w*,  the penalty  TIP threatens  a net profit squeeze  because t,(w*)  is 
greater  than  b. For some appropriate  value of m, the new optimum  w** 
will equal  the TIP target  n; and ti (wi  * *  ) will equal b, so that  no actual 
net profit  squeeze occurs. Thus, it may be optimal for management  to 
choose a wage increase  at which  the tax rate is unaltered,  solely because 
O7ry/Owi  has been raised  in absolute  value by TIP. 
It is instructive  to contrast  a penalty TIP with an increase  in b, the 
ordinary  income  tax rate.  At wj*, both threaten  a net profit  squeeze,  and 
both would  cause the firm  to reduce  wi. In the case of an increase  in the 
ordinary  tax rate, however,  the final equilibrium  w**  must involve a 
higher  tax rate, and  therefore  a lower  level of net profit  because  ti equals 
b for  all wi. 
Thus, the impact of TIP at w*  and wi** must be carefully  distin- 
guished.  Both a penalty  TIP and a reward  TIP sustain  the new optimum, 
w **, primarily  through  the TIP incentive  effect.  The difference  between 
a penalty  TIP and a reward  TIP is important  at w,*, the wage increase 
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decrease  the level of current  net profit  at w*;  in contrast,  a penalty  TIP 
would  squeeze  net profit  at w/*. Thus, it is almost  certain  that a penalty 
TIP will provide  a stronger  incentive  to reduce  wi below w*. 
The  Impact  of TIP  in a Collective  Bargaining  Model 
Perhaps  the most important  and difficult  test for TIP is whether  it can 
reduce  the wage increase  in an oligopolistic  industry,  in which  large  cor- 
porations  engage in industry-wide  (explicit or implicit) collective bar- 
gaining  with  a "strong"  union. 
The basic assumption  of the collective bargaining  model is that the 
actual  wage increase  in a given industry  can be regarded  as the result  of 
the interaction  of union "push"  (P)  and management  "resistance"  (R). 
The interaction  of union push and management  resistance,  prior to the 
introduction  of TIP, is shown  in the diagram,  which  seeks  to explain  why 
the wage increase  was 8 percent.  As the diagram  shows, if a 6 percent 
increase had been tentatively  considered at the bargaining  table, the 
union's  push for a larger  raise would have exceeded management's  re- 
sistance  to it. Similarly,  if a 10 percent  increase  had been considered, 
management's  determination  to achieve a lower settlement  would evi- 
dently  have exceeded  the union's  determination  to prevent  such a reduc- 
tion. At 8 percent,  labor's push and management's  resistance  are bal- 
anced. 
Push and  resistance  should  be regarded  as bargaining  postures  or atti- 
tudes  that imply  particular  concrete  actions.  For example,  union push at 
8 percent  would  increase  if workers  were  willing  to endure  a longer  strike 
in order  to achieve  some extra  raise.  Similarly,  management  resistance  at 
8 percent  would increase  if it were willing to endure  a longer strike  in 
order  to prevent  a given  increment. 
What  determines  the shape  and  position  of the two curves?  The union's 
push for an additional  increment  is positive at all tentative  w . But the 
larger  the tentative  wi, the smaller  the push. Workers  are willing  to en- 
dure  a strike  of only X days  to raise  wi,  from 10 to 1  1 percent,  while  they 
would  be willing  to endure  a strike  of Y days (with Y greater  than  X)  to 
raise  wi from  4 to 5 percent.  The position  of the union-push  curve  at each 
w, will be higher: (1)  the greater  the rate of wage increase  that other 
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/11  \ 
W*~~  R 
(6 percent)  (8 percenat) 
inflation, (3)  the lower the unemployment rate, and (4)  the larger the 
net profit rate expected to result from a given wage. Factors  (1)  and 
(2)  are based on the assumption that workers are concerned about rela- 
tive and real wage increases rather than absolute nominal wage increases. 
Factor  (3)  is plausible in part because workers might be more willing 
to  risk a prolonged  strike and layoffs  after the  settlement if the pros- 
pects of finding a new job were greater. Factors  (1)  and (3)  are con- 
sistent with the wage equations presented in table 1. And factor (4)  may 
be plausible because the larger the net profit expected to result from a 
given wi,  the larger is the apparent ability of  management to  "afford" 
higher wages, thereby inducing workers to risk a longer strike to achieve 
a given increment. 
The resistance of management is based on the objective of maximizing 
the value of the firm (or perhaps the value of its own income stream). In 
the range relevant for bargaining, the resistance of management to any 
addition is positive because a larger wage increase would reduce the value 
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profit, and therefore  the larger will be the resistance  to an additional 
amount,  using  the reasoning  of the previous  section.  Thus, the resistance 
of management  to a still  larger  raise  at a given  wi is greater  ( 1  ) the greater 
the reduction  in net profit  that  would  result  from  the increment,  and (2) 
the  lower  the  level of current  net  profit  at wi. 
This model is consistent  with the wage equations  presented  in table 1. 
The level of net profit is assumed  to affect both push and resistance 
curves,  and  should  therefore  affect  the wage  increase  that  results.  Factors 
(1)  and (3)  that influence  the position  of the push curve are consistent 
with  the performance  of the wt-i and Ut variables,  respectively,  in table 1. 
The introduction  of an employer  TIP results  in an upward  shift of the 
R curve  shown  in the diagram  above.  At each wi, TIP (whether  penalty 
or reward)  will increase  the decrement  in current  net profit  that results 
from  a given  increase  in wi. This is the TIP incentive  effect,  and  its mag- 
nitude depends  primarily  on m. A penalty  TIP, in contrast  to a reward 
TIP, however,  will also influence  the position of the R curve  because  it 
will reduce  the level of net profit  w1*. This is the penalty  TIP income, 
or profit  squeeze,  effect at w*.  Because  the penalty  TIP combines  both 
substitution  and income effects at wj*, it should generate  greater  resis- 
tance  at wit than  a reward  TIP. 
Even if the union  P curve  is unaltered,  the upward  shift  of the R curve 
should reduce the resulting  wage. Under a penalty TIP, however,  it is 
plausible  that  the P curve  will shift down at w*  because  it would  reduce 
the expected  net profit  rate  at wi* (the fourth  influence  on the position  of 
the P curve). The shift  in the P curve  is not shown  in the diagram.  If the 
TIP multiplier  is properly  set, then  wit * will equal  n; and  the tax rate  will 
equal b, so there would be no actual profit squeeze. As in the value- 
maximization  model, the new optimum  wi * does not require  an actual 
net profit  squeeze.  At w  *,  the R curve  is higher,  although  the tax rate 
and level of net profit  are unaltered,  because an increment  in wi would 
cause  a greater  decrement  in net  profit. 
It has thus far been assumed  that an increase  in the tax rate would in 
fact reduce  current  net profit.  In an oligopolistic  industry,  however,  the 
same  wage  increase  often  is set for all firms.  Is it possible  that,  in response 
to a penalty  TIP, firms  will grant  the same  w*,  and  then raise  price  suffi- 
ciently so that gross profit  increases,  offsetting  the higher  tax rate, and 
thereby  preventing  a decline  in current  net profit  at wj*? In this extreme 
case in which  firms  shift  the penalty  fully in the short  run, a penalty  TIP 
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I have  examined  this  possibility.'0  The main  points  of that analysis  are 
summarized  below.  First,  if m is sufficiently  large,  the tax surcharge  must 
outweigh  any rise in gross profit,  thereby  squeezing  net profit  at wj*. In 
the extreme,  suppose that t (wj*)  equals 100 percent.  No matter  how 
much  the firm  raises  gross  profits  at w*,  its net profit  will be zero..  A key 
feature  of a tax penalty  on the income  tax of the firm  is that,  in effect,  the 
Internal  Revenue Service "goes last." First the firm raises price in an 
attempt  to raise gross profit;  then the Internal  Revenue  Service  taxes a 
larger  portion  of the gross  profit.  For a sufficiently  large  m, full short-run 
shifting  of the TIP penalty so that net profit is not squeezed  at w9* is 
literally  impossible.  Even with realistic,  modest values of m, however, 
large  increases  in gross profit  would be required  to keep net profit  from 
declining.  For example,  if m were  6 percent  and  n were  6 percent  in equa- 
tion 1, the tax rate would rise from 48 percent  to 60 percent  if the firm 
granted  a wage increase  of 8 percent.  The firm  must  then  be able to raise 
gross  profit  by 30 percent  to avoid a reduction  in net profit. 
Moreover,  it is far from certain  that firms  will be able to raise gross 
profit  significantly.  Even with  industry-wide  bargaining,  import  competi- 
tion may  limit  the ability  of oligopolists  to raise  gross  profit  by increasing 
prices.  Because  wages are set separately  for different  industries,  one in- 
dustry cannot assume that its own wage increase  will be matched  by 
others;  thus,  an industry  that  significantly  exceeds  the TIP target  may  find 
sales  growing  more  slowly  as demand  shifts  to other  industries. 
Although  partial  shifting  is certainly  possible, it would involve a net 
profit  decline at wj*, so that both income and substitution  effects  would 
provide an incentive  to hold down wages. Despite the reduction  in wi, 
might the partial shifting  worsen price inflation?  Briefly stated, in an 
oligopolistic  industry  with reserve  market  power, it is possible, though 
very unlikely,  that shifting  would cause a temporary  rise in the inflation 
rate. Even under  this worst scenario,  the temporary  rise would soon be 
permanently  reversed  after a transition  period when firms raised their 
markup  to cover the higher  tax rate. Thereafter,  the price inflation  rate 
would follow the decline in the wage inflation  rate. A permanent  rise in 
the inflation  rate could occur only if there  were a permanently  rising  tax 
rate-not  merely  a new,  higher  tax rate. 
If a penalty  TIP were only a temporary  policy, even the small chance 
of an initial rise in the inflation  rate would be a serious  liability.  As the 
10. Laurence S.  Seidman, "Would Tax-Shifting Undermine  the  Tax-Based 
Incomes Policy?" Journal of Economic Issues (forthcoming, September 1978). 320  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
next section will show, however,  a penalty TIP should be viewed as a 
permanent  policy with a permanent  impact;  hence, the small risk of a 
temporary  adverse  effect  is less serious. 
When  the penalty tax is levied on the income of the firm-revenue 
minus cost-in  effect, the Internal  Revenue Service "goes last." If the 
penalty  tax were levied on either cost or revenue,  the shifting  problem 
would be much more serious: in effect, the Internal  Revenue Service 
would  "go first,"  and the firm  would  "go last."  For example,  suppose  the 
penalty  were  levied  on the payroll  (wage  bill) of the firm.  The firm  might 
then  be able to raise  price and  revenue  sufficiently  to maintain  net profit. 
One version  of employer  TIP-that  the wage bill in excess of the guide- 
post be disallowed  as a deduction  in the computation  of income tax-is 
in effect  a payroll  tax surcharge,  and  would  therefore  be more  vulnerable 
to shifting  than  the income  tax surcharge."" 
The  Impact  of TIP  on the  NAIRU 
The microanalysis  thus far has established  that, given the recent rate 
of wage increase  throughout  the economy, the product  demand  of the 
firm,  and the unemployment  rate, TIP would cause the average  firm  to 
grant  a smaller  wage  increase  than  it otherwise  would.  However,  the final 
impact  of TIP on the macroeconomy  can be determined  only when the 
micromodel  is linked  to a macromodel  that relates  wage inflation,  price 
inflation,  unemployment  rate, and money supply.  This section  will pro- 
vide such a macromodel. 
PRICE  BEHAVIOR 
Consider  the  following  price  equation: 
(8)  ps =  Wt-a, 
where  a is the trend growth  rate of average  labor productivity  (output 
per man-hour). Here, p refers to increases in the value-added  price, 
which  nets out the unit cost of purchases  from other  sectors. 
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The derivation  of 8 is as follows.'2 First, define the markup  M?  of 
value-added  price P over standard  unit factor cost UC, where UC ex- 
cludes  intermediate  product  cost, but includes  a minimum  rate of return 
on capital  per  unit  of trend  output: 
P 
(9)  M  C 
Next, consider  the markup  of price  over  standard  unit  labor  cost ULC; 
ULC  equals  the ratio  of wages  per man-hour  W to trend  output  per man- 
hour  A. Let F be the ratio of standard  unit labor cost to standard  unit 
cost: 
(10)  F  ULC  Uc. 
The markup  K of price  over standard  unit  labor  cost is defined  as: 
(11)  K  PC 
ULC' 
From  equations  9, 10, and 11: 
(12)  K-  F 
If two industries  have  the same  F, then  the one with  the greater  market 
power  will have the larger  K. From 11 the following  relationship  among 
growth  rates  must  hold approximately: 
(13)  p  =  k +  ulc =  k +  w-a. 
The secular  trend  of k is close to zero, so that 13 is approximated  by 
8. In 1977, the annual growth  rate of wages in the United States was 
approximately  8 percent;  the trend  growth  rate  of productivity,  2 percent; 
and  the  inflation  rate,  6 percent. 
The near-zero  trend  value of k reflects  the behavior  over the long run 
of  ? and F. According  to standard  microeconomics,  the markup  of a 
12. An early exposition is given in Sidney Weintraub,  A General Theory of the 
Price Level, Output, Income Distribution, and Economic Growth (Chilton, 1959). 
Econometric price equations similar to 8 are presented in Otto Eckstein, ed., The 
Econometrics of  Price Determination, A  Conference sponsored by the Board of 
Governors of  the  Federal Reserve System and Social Science Research Center 
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firm  is determined  by the degree  of competition  in its industry.  Whatever 
the level of X, its secular  trend (ignoring  fluctuations  over the business 
cycle) is close to horizontal;  the average  degree  of market  power in the 
economy  generally  changes  only slowly, if at all, over time. Unit factor 
cost UC equals the sum of unit labor cost and unit nonlabor  cost, in- 
cluding  unit depreciation  cost, unit net capital cost, and unit indirect 
business  tax cost. It is possible that the ratio of unit labor cost to unit 
nonlabor  cost changes  only slowly  over time. 
The  fact that  the trend  value  of k is close to zero  is crucial  for the trend 
in the distribution  of income between  labor and capital, as can be seen 
from 11. However, the main conclusion  of this section-that  TIP can 
lower the NAIRU-would  hold for any constant k, as will be shown 
below. 
INTEGRATING  MONEY  INTO  THE  SYSTEM 
Equations  7 and 8 imply a relationship  between  inflation  and unem- 
ployment.  To focus on this relationship,  the following (simplified) in- 
verse  correlation  between  the unemployment  rate and the net profit  rate 
will  be assumed: 
(14)  i,N  c (  ),  c > O. 
When  Ut equals U,  irN equals  VN, Substituting  14 into 7 yields: 
(7a)  Wt  Wt-i  =  h(  Ut)  h=  +  zc>  0. 
If Ut equals U, the wage inflation  rate remains  constant;  if U, is less 
(greater)  than U,  the  wage  inflation  rate  rises (falls). To simplify  matters, 
h will  be regarded  as constant  in the relevant  range.  If 8 is substituted  into 
7a: 
(15)  pt -  pt-I  (U  h  u) 
It should  be noted  that if 13 rather  than  8 had  been substituted  into 7a, 
15 would  still follow, as long as kt equals  kt,l. A constant  growth  rate of 
the markup,  which  may or may  not be zero, is sufficient  to yield 15. 
The  system  is accelerationist  in the  following  sense.  If the monetary  and 
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limit, rather  than converging  to any stable rate. This follows from the 
assumption,  supported  in table 1, that the coefficient  of wt,  in 7a is 1. 
The system  has a NAIRU, defined as the unemployment  rate at which 
the inflation  rate would remain constant (not necessarily  zero)  at its 
initial  value.  Prior  to the introduction  of TIP, the NAIRU is U, according 
to 15. 
The price equation  8 embodies  the wage view of inflation.  According 
to the wage  equation  7a, however,  wt is endogenous  and depends  on Ut, 
another  endogenous  variable.  This  wage-price  system  is, in fact, consistent 
with  a monetary  view of inflation.13  Given  the monetarist  assumption  that 
in the long run the growth  rate of the money supply s determines  the 
growth  rate  of nominal  income,  then  if s is held constant,  Ut will converge 
to the NAIRU; Pt and  wt will converge  to equilibrium  values  that depend 
on s. 
The impact  of TIP on the wage-price  system  will now be shown.  In the 
earlier  microanalysis,  TIP causes  a smaller  wi in a particular  period  than 
would have occurred  in its absence,  other things held constant.  An im- 
portant  consequence  of TIP as a permanent  policy  is that  this effect  would 
occur each period.  Suppose  that in the first  year Ut is at U, the NAIRU 
without  TIP, so that  if wt-, were  8 percent,  the average  firm  would  grant  8 
percent  this year without  TIP; and if a were 2 percent,  Pt would be 6 
percent.  Suppose  that a penalty  TIP with an interim  target  n of 7 percent 
would  threaten  a higher  tax rate  at 8 percent,  and  therefore  cause  the firm 
to cut wi by 1 percentage  point  below wt,.  Thus,  wt would  be 7 percent; 
and Pt, 5 percent.  Then in the following  year, wt-l would be 7 percent. 
The labor supply  function  implied  by the value-maximization  model and 
the union push curve in the collective  bargaining  model would shift to 
reflect  the fact that wt-, equal to 7 percent  is the new norm. (And Pt-i 
would  be 5 percent.) If n is now cut to 6 percent  while  m is held constant, 
a penalty  TIP would threaten  the same higher  tax rate if 7 percent  were 
granted.  Once again,  this should  cause  the firm  to cut wt perhaps  1 point 
below  wtl, to 6 percent. 
Let wt* be the wage inflation  rate that would occur without TIP in 
period  t according  to 7, given the values of the right-hand  variables  Ut, 
TrN, and wt,., Suppose  that in each period, under a permanent  penalty 
13. Laurence S. Seidman, "The Tax-Based Incomes Policy and the Monetary 
View of Inflation: A Reconciliation" (University of Pennsylvania, Department of 
Economics,  November 1977; processed). 324  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
TIP, nt were set so that (wt* -  nt)  were equal to 0, where 0 is some 
constant  percentage  (1 point in the example  just given). Then in each 
period, with m held constant, a penalty TIP would threaten  the same 
higher  tax rate at wt* and exert the same downward  pressure  on wt at 
wt*. In each period,  therefore,  a penalty  TIP should cause wt to be less 
than wt*. Thus, a penalty  TIP should  permanently  shift down the wage 
equation  by 0: 
(7b)  wt-w00  =  r  .  )  +  Z (  7r  )-@  ?  >  ?- 
Then  7a and 15 become: 
(7c)  Wt -  Wt  =  h (U  -U  t)  -  =  Pt -Pt-i. 
The new NAIRU would  be less than U because  it takes a lower value 
of Ut (U*)  to make  the middle  of 7c equal to zero. Specifically: 
_  h  U<U 
(16)  h + 0 
Intuitively,  the increased  downward  pressure  on wt due to the TIP in- 
centive  effect  will now counter  the upward  pressure  from this lower Ut, 
causing  wt to equal,  rather  than  to exceed,  wt-, in 7c at this Ut. 
Given  the monetarist  assumption  concerning  nominal  income  and the 
wage-price  system  adjusted  for TIP, it can  be shown  that a specific  rate  of 
monetary  growth  would continue  to cause the system  to converge  to the 
same long-run,  equilibrium  inflation  rate.'4 TIP would not permanently 
reduce the inflation rate, but rather would permanently  reduce the 
NAIRU. 
A numerical  example  of TIP's impact  is provided  in table 2. There, 
without  TIP, the system  would remain  in its initial equilibrium  indefi- 
nitely, in the absence  of shocks, with s kept at 7 percent.  Now suppose 
that  a penalty  TIP were  introduced,  and  that  m and  nt were  set so that  wi 
would  be 2 percentage  points  less than it would otherwise  have been for 
the average  firm.  Suppose  that the h parameter  were 0.04. Then from 16 
the  new  NAIRU under  TIP  would  be 4 percent. 
One approach  to disinflation  would be initially  to set st each year so 
that Ut remained  at 6 percent.  Then each year  wt and  Pt would  decline  2 
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Table  2. A Disinflation  Path under  fIPO 
Percent 
Year  ut  Wt  Pt  St  nt  ti 
0  6.0  8.0  6.0  7.0  ...  48 
1  5.6  6.3  4.3  5.7  6.3  48 
2  5.2  4.9  2.9  4.3  4.9  48 
3  4.8  3.9  1.9  3.3  3.9  48 
4  4.6  3.1  1.1  2.3  3.1  48 
5  4.4  2.6  0.6  1.8  2.6  48 
6  4.2  2.3  0.3  1.5  2.3  48 
7  4.1  2.1  0.1  1.2  2.1  48 
8  4.1  2.0  0.0  1.0  2.0  48 
9  4.0  2.0  0.0  1.1  2.0  48 
10  4.0  2.0  0.0  1.0  2.0  48 
Source: Derived from the model presented in Laurence S. Seidman, "The Tax-Based Incomes Policy 
and  the  Monetary View of  Inflation: A  Reconciliation" (University of  Pennsylvania, Department of 
Economics, November 1977; processed). 
a.  The variables are defined as follows:  Ut  unemployment rate, Wt =  rate of  change in  wages, pi 
=  rate of change in prices, st =  rate of growth of  the money supply, nt =  target rate of increase  in wages 
with TIP, and ti =  the tax rate of a firm with TIP. Initially, so =  7 percent, Uo =  Ui =  6 percent, and qo 
(the growth rate of real output) =  3 percent. It is assumed tlhroughout  that a, the trend growth rate of 
productivity, and v, the trend growth rate of the velocity of money, each are equal to 2 percent; and the 
trend growth rate of the labor force is equal to  1 percent. 
percentage  points and the interim  target  nt would  be adjusted  downward 
by 2 points.  At the end of three  years,  the permanent  targets,  w at 2 per- 
cent  and  p at 0 percent,  would  be achieved.  Then  st should  be temporarily 
increased  to reduce  Ut to 4 percent.  When Ut equals  4 percent,  st would 
be set at 1 percent  indefinitely,  thereby  maintaining  this equilibrium  in 
the absence  of shocks. 
This approach,  however,  makes  no progress  in reducing  Ut until the 
permanent  inflation  target  is achieved.  Furthermore,  it requires  a rapid 
expansion  at the end of the third  year. An alternative  disinflation  path, 
shown  in table  2, is likely  to be regarded  as preferable.  In each period,  nt 
is adjusted  downward  so that,  without  TIP, wt* would  exceed  nt by 2 per- 
centage  points,  but with  TIP, wt would  approximate  nt. In the final  equi- 
librium,  n is permanently  set at 2 percent,  and  wt permanently  remains  at 
2 percent.  In the absence  of TIP, when Ut equals 4 percent,  wt* would 
exceed wt-l by 2 points;  TIP just offsets  that upward  pressure  on wage 
inflation,  thereby  keeping  wt equal  to wt-l (2 percent). 
This simple  illustration  shows  how a penalty  TIP and monetary  policy 
should  ideally  be coordinated  to reduce  gradually  both inflation  and un- 
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tain the desired  values  for m, nt, and st are not known, and at best can 
only be imperfectly  estimated.  Thus, in practice,  the path to equilibrium 
cannot  be fine-tuned  as in table 2. Moreover,  other "shocks"  will tem- 
porarily  move the system  away  from  its desired  values,  and countercyci- 
cal monetary  and fiscal  policies  will be necessary  to return  the system  to 
its targets.  Nevertheless,  if TIP becomes a permanent  feature  of the sys- 
tem, it should  eventually  be possible  to achieve  an average  combination 
of inflation  and unemployment  that is lower than what could have been 
achieved  without  TIP.'5 
An Employee  TIP 
An employee  TIP could be introduced  either  in place of an employer 
TIP or as a complement  to it. Elsewhere  I have analyzed  the employee 
TIP.'6  In this  section,  the  main  issues  will  be treated. 
An employee  TIP is subject  to the same  penalty-reward  permutations 
given  earlier  for an employer  TIP. For example,  employees  at firm  i could 
be given  a tax cut if the average  wage  increase  at i were  below a threshold, 
a tax increase  if the average  wage increase  were above a target,  or both 
if the  target  equaled  the  threshold. 
The reward  or penalty  for each employee  at firm  i must  depend  on the 
average  wage increase  at i, not on the individual  employee's  own wage 
increase,  because  the purpose  of the incentive  is to discourage  increases 
in the entire wage structure  of the firm, not to discourage  promotion 
and  upgrading  of individual  employees. 
One method  of implementing  an employee  TIP is to use the withhold- 
ing system  at each firm.  For example,  if the wage increase  at firm  i war- 
ranted  a tax cut, the actual  income  tax withholding  rate could  be cut;  but 
employees  could be credited  on their W-2 forms as if the withholding 
rate had not been cut. Under this method, the employee  TIP would be 
fully administered  by the employer  and would place no additional  com- 
pliance burden  on individual  employees.  At the same time, employees 
could  be made  aware  of the employee  TIP tax credit  or surcharge  on each 
paycheck  and on the W-2 form, so that the TIP might  influence  the bar- 
gaining  posture  of employees. 
15. Robert S. Chirinko and Laurence  S. Seidman, "The Tax-Based Incomes Pol- 
icy and Optimal Control," discussion paper 390  (University of Pennsylvania, De- 
partment  of Economics, February 1977; processed). 
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If the penalty  completely  eliminated  the gain from exceeding  the tar- 
get or if the reward  completely  compensated  employees  for the shortfall 
below the threshold,  the employee  TIP would surely  reduce  wi. Such an 
extreme  penalty  or reward  would have harmful  consequences,  however. 
A future  projection  must  be made  to estimate  whether  the gain has been 
completely  eliminated  or the shortfall  fully compensated.  For example, 
suppose  in year 0 the average  employee  at firm  i received  $100 a week, 
and the interim  TIP target  was 6 percent,  or $106 for i. Under the pen- 
alty TIP, suppose  100 percent  of the excess above $106 was taxed away 
in year 1. The average  employee  may  still be better  off in future  years,  the 
larger  the wage  increase  in year 1. One  possible  projection  is shown  in the 
diagram.  If the average  employee  made  this particular  projection,  then to 
eliminate  the gain, the year 1 tax would have to exceed 100 percent,  so 
that the loss in year 1 balanced  the gain in future  years. 
The tax penalty required  to eliminate  the gain, however, will vary 
among  individual  employees  because the gain depends  on how long the 
employee  will work  for firm  i. For example,  an employee  who plans to 
work  at i for only one year (year 1) would  have  his gain completely  elim- 328  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
inated  with  a 100 percent  tax. Thus, a tax penalty  that exactly  eliminates 
the gain  for the average  employee  would  more  than  eliminate  it for some, 
and  less  than  eliminate  it for others. 
A penalty  or reward  sufficiently  large  to eliminate  exactly  the gain for 
an employee  with average  expected  tenure  would  produce  serious  equity 
and  efficiency  problems.  How would  a firm  seek  to expand  its labor  force 
in response  to a rise in product  demand?  For example,  suppose  that for 
each $1 above $106, employees  were taxed $2; and for each $1 below 
$106, they were rewarded  $2. If $110 were granted,  the tax penalty 
would be $8; thus, in year 1, the average  employee  would receive only 
$102; this loss in year 1 might  be just balanced  by the expected  gain in 
future years from beginning  year 2  at $110. Similarly,  if $102 were 
granted,  the tax reward  would  be $8, so in year 1, the average  employee 
would  receive  $110; this gain in year 1 might  be just balanced  by the ex- 
pected  future  loss from  beginning  year 2 at $102. Thus, the average  em- 
ployee  looking  ahead  might  be indifferent  to the size of the wage  increase 
in  year 1. 
Current  and  new employees  who joined  in year 1, however,  would  pre- 
fer lower  wages  if their  expected  tenure  were less than average;  and con- 
versely,  higher  wages if their  expected  tenure  were greater  than average. 
Because  some employees  would be adversely  affected  by higher  wages, 
while  others  would  be adversely  affected  by lower  wages,  inefficient  turn- 
over would be encouraged.  Whether  the firm  raises  or lowers its rate of 
wage increase,  it will cause employees  who are so affected  to consider 
seeking  employment  elsewhere.  Moreover,  potential  new employees  who 
might  join in year 2 would  be more  attracted  in year 2, the greater  the wi 
in year 1, because  they would not bear the year 1 tax penalty.  Without 
an employee  TIP, an employer  knows that the larger  the wage increase 
he grants,  the more attractive  his firm  is to all current  and potential  em- 
ployees.  Under an employee  TIP that eliminated  the gain to the average 
employee,  this  would  not  be the case. 
Because  of these equity  and efficiency  consequences,  a permanent  em- 
ployee  TIP should  not completely  eliminate  the gain from exceeding  the 
target  or completely  compensate  for the shortfall  below the threshold. 
An increase  in wages  must  still benefit  all employees  to some degree.  This 
means,  however,  that it is no longer  clear  that an employee  TIP will pro- 
vide  a strong  incentive. 
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an employee  TIP under  which an increase  in wages still provides  some 
positive  gain to employees.  Earlier,  four factors that influence  the posi- 
tion of the union  push  curve  were  listed.  Two additional  factors  must  now 
be added.  The height of the union push curve at a given wage increase 
will be higher: (5)  the greater  the increment  in real (inflation-adjusted) 
after-tax  income  that results  from  a given  increase  in wages,  and (6)  the 
smaller  the gain (from the past year  to the current  year) in real after-tax 
income  from  that  wage  increase. 
Factor 5 is the substitution,  or incentive  effect, which motivates  the 
employee  TIP proposal.  As in the case of an employer  TIP, the same  in- 
centive effect can be achieved  by a penalty or a reward  employee  TIP. 
Because  an employee  TIP, whether  penalty  or reward,  reduces  the after- 
tax gain from a given increase  in wages, this substitution  effect should 
shift down  the union  push curve  in the first  diagram  in this paper. 
Factor 6 is the income effect. To analyze  its impact,  consider  an em- 
ployee penalty  TIP with an interim  target  of 6 percent,  and suppose  that 
without  TIP, wage  increases  were  8 percent  at the average  firm  (with p at 
6 percent  for the whole economy). First  consider  the optimistic  view that 
employees  believe  that,  in response  to TIP, the rate of price  inflation  will 
be reduced  by the full 2 percentage  points sought  by the program.  Then 
a partial  TIP penalty (less than 100 percent) would lead employees  to 
expect  a higher  real after-tax  income  for an 8 percent  raise  with  TIP than 
without  it. The expected  slowing  of inflation  under  TIP would add 2 per- 
centage points to their real income, outweighing  the reduction  of real 
income  from the partial  TIP penalty.  Thus, the income effect would re- 
inforce  the substitution  effect,  helping  to shift  down  the union  push  curve 
at 8 percent. 
Now consider  the pessimistic  view that employees  do not believe TIP 
will lower  inflation  below 6 percent.  Then,  because  of the penalty,  a wage 
increase  of 8 percent  will be expected  to yield a smaller  gain  in real after- 
tax income with a penalty  TIP than without  it. In this case, the income 
effect would work against  the substitution  effect. While the substitution 
effect  may still dominate,  the result  is no longer  unambiguous. 
An employee  TIP must operate  through  a penalty,  with an employee 
tax rate  in which ti (w*)  is greater  than b if the average  tax rate on em- 
ployees is to remain  unaltered  (assuming  that TIP succeeds  in reducing 
wage  inflation).  If the government  could afford  to reduce  the average  tax 
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Consider  an employee  reward  TIP with ti given  by equation  2, g equal 
to 8 percent,  and  the same  b and  m as the penalty  TIP. Then even under 
the pessimistic  view, such a program  should  unambiguously  reduce  wage 
inflation.  The substitution  effect  is the same  as for a penalty  TIP, and any 
income effect associated  with a reward  will reinforce the substitution 
effect.  Even if employees  believe that p will remain  6 percent,  the gain 
from an 8 percent  wage increase (which incurs  neither  a penalty  nor a 
reward)  will be unaltered;  with no income effect,  the substitution  effect 
should  reduce  wage  increases. 
It seems  doubtful  that an employee  TIP could be a reliable  substitute 
for an employer  penalty TIP. As explained earlier, an employee TIP 
must  not eliminate  the gain to employees  of increasing  wages, and hence 
it is not clear how strong  an incentive  it would provide.  Under an em- 
ployer penalty  TIP, the firm must reduce w, below w,* to avoid a net 
profit  squeeze.  Management  is obliged  to respond  to an employer  penalty 
TIP because  the consequences  of not doing so are severe.  Under an em- 
ployee TIP, employees  will merely  gain  less from an increment  of wages, 
and  may not be very  responsive  to the TIP incentive  effect. 
Nevertheless,  an employee  TIP should  be a useful complement  to an 
employer  penalty  TIP. In the discussion  of income  distribution,  it will be 
suggested  that if the decline in price inflation  does not match  the decline 
in wage inflation (contrary  to theory and econometric  evidence), em- 
ployees might  be compensated  for their wage restraint.  Such compensa- 
tion could be naturally  integrated  with an employee TIP if it were in 
effect.  Under the employee  TIP, the tax cut or surcharge  for employees 
of each firm  would already  be computed.  Compensation  could be imple- 
mented  by raising  the tax cut for employees  and reducing  the surcharge 
on them at each firm,  perhaps  by adjusting  the income tax withholding 
rate,  as suggested  earlier.  An employee  TIP would  therefore  facilitate  the 
implementation  of compensatory  tax rebates  to protect  labor  under  TIP. 
The Welfare Economics of TIP 
Two aspects  of the welfare  economics  of TIP are considered:  its im- 
pact on allocative  efficiency  and on income distribution.  Both have im- 
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ALLOCATIVE  EFFICIENCY 
As has been argued  above,  the institutional  features  and ethical  norms 
of modem labor markets  and the income-maintenance  programs  of the 
welfare state have had the socially undesirable  effect of  raising the 
NAIRU above  the social optimum;  but these deviations  from a classical, 
atomistic  labor market  have also had socially desirable  consequences. 
Imagine  an unorganized  labor  market  in which  workers  compete  individ- 
ually with one another for jobs in intense, atomistic rivalry. Uncon- 
strained  by ethical  norms,  employers  encourage  this competition  among 
individual  workers  and do not hesitate to replace an employed  worker 
with an unemployed  rival  who will accept  a lower  wage.  Moreover,  there 
are no income-maintenance  programs.  The consequence  of prolonged 
unemployment  is catastrophic. 
In such an economy, the NAIRU would be significantly  lower than 
that  of the current  economy.  Each worker  would weigh  the wage offered 
against  the value  of leisure  or job search,  and offer  to work  as long as the 
former exceeded the latter. The equilibrium  unemployment  rate, or 
NAIRU, would  be optimal  with  respect  to allocative  efficiency  (the trade- 
off of work  versus  leisure-search). 
Many  economists,  including  me, believe  that the development  of trade 
unions, ethical constraints  on employers,  and income-maintenance  pro- 
grams on the whole have significantly  advanced social welfare, even 
though  they impair  allocative  efficiency  and convey a distorted  signal  of 
the work versus leisure-search  preference  of individual  workers.  From 
this perspective,  the appropriate  response  is to investigate  whether  or not 
policy can be designed  to reduce  the NAIRU while preserving  the posi- 
tive contributions  of existing  institutions. 
From a microeconomic  perspective,  the problem  is that the average 
individual  firm  grants  a larger  wage  increase,  at any given  unemployment 
rate, than is optimal.  The standard  microeconomic  approach  to this ex- 
ternality  would  be to charge  each firm  for raising  the NAIRU through  its 
"excessive"  wage  increase.  A TIP would  attempt  to do this. It would add 
one new incentive,  but would not eliminate  the market  forces that con- 
tinue to shape  relative  wage and price  patterns  and help guide  resources 
efficiently. 
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patterns.  Suppose  that firm  A had a labor shortage  because  demand  for 
its product  was increasing,  while firm  B (equal in size to firm  A)  had a 
labor surplus  because demand for its product was declining.  Without 
TIP, at the excessive  NAIRU suppose  A granted  a 10 percent  wage in- 
crease,  and B, 6 percent,  so that the average  was 8 percent.  If TIP were 
introduced  with an interim  target  of 6 percent,  A might  grant  7 percent, 
and  B, 5 percent,  so that  the average  would  be reduced  to 6 percent.  Ulti- 
mately, when the permanent  inflation and unemployment  targets are 
achieved,  A might  grant  3 percent,  and B, 1 percent,  so that  the average 
would  be 2 percent.  Because  TIP would  not influence  labor  shortage  and 
surplus  and would leave each firm  free to make its own decisions,  basic 
relative  wage and  price  patterns  should  still emerge. 
The objective of preserving  the allocative function of relative wage 
changes  does, however,  tend to limit the size of the TIP multiplier  m and 
hence the extent  to which the NAIRU can be lowered.  There is a social 
cost to a high m. Raising  m not only reduces  the average  wage increase, 
but also reduces  the variance  around  it, thereby  impeding  the allocative 
function  of relative  wage  changes. 
Consider  three alternative  tax schedules for an employer penalty- 
reward  TIP (with a target  of 2 percent) and for the NAIRU that each 
would  hypothetically  achieve: 
Schedule  ti (percent)  NAIRU  (percent) 
1  48+  O(w  -2)  6 
2  48 +  5(wi-2)  4 
3  48+10(wi-2)  3 
If the unemployment  rate were at the NAIRU, an illustrative  disper- 
sion  of wi between  the  firms  might  be: 
Firm A, shortage  Firm B, surplus 
Schedule  (percent)  (percent) 
1  4  0 
2  3  1 
3  21/2  1?2 
Under  schedule  1, in effect  without  TIP, the firm's  tax rate  is uniformly 
48 percent.  Under schedule  2, however,  the firm's  tax rate would rise to 
58 percent  if it gave a wage increase  of 4 percent,  and would fall to 38 
percent  if it gave 0 percent.  As a result,  the optimum  wage increase  for 
firm  A should  be less than 4 percent,  say, 3 percent;  the wage increase 
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ule 3, the firm's  tax rate would be higher  than under  schedule  2 at each 
wi above 2 percent,  and lower at each wi below 2 percent;  and the dis- 
persion  of wage increases  between A and B would be even more com- 
pressed. 
In the extreme  case, if m is large,  no firm  can afford  to give more  than 
2 percent;  and employees  would not tolerate  less than 2 percent  because 
the reduced  corporate  income  tax under  a penalty  TIP would give man- 
agement  a large  increase  in net profit.  This case is virtually  equivalent  to 
uniform  wage control at 2 percent.  A key advantage  of TIP over wage 
controls  is that  the market  forces  that shape  relative  wage  patterns  would 
continue  to operate  automatically,  provided  that m is not too large. But 
a large  m overwhelms  these  forces  and  approaches  uniform  wage control. 
Thus,  there  is a trade-off. 
The cost of a large  m lies in slowing  the speed  with  which  the equilib- 
rium pattern  of relative  wage levels required  for efficient  allocation is 
attained.  The more compressed  the distribution  of wage changes, the 
longer  it takes  to reach  the desired  pattern  of wage levels. Similarly,  TIP 
should  somewhat  slow the speed  of adjustment  of the relative  size of two 
industries,  like A and B in the example  above, by reducing  the retained 
earnings  with  which  A may  finance  its expansion.  Thus,  more  time  will be 
required  for the desired  ratio of capital  stocks  to be attained  for the two 
industries.  It should  be emphasized,  however,  that once the new relative 
wage is achieved,  the tax rates will again be equalized.  The cost of a 
larger  m is therefore  the reduced  speed of adjustment,  not a permanent 
misallocation  of resources. 
The case for TIP rests on the plausible  assumption  that neither  an m 
of zero (in effect,  no TIP), nor a large m (in effect,  uniform  wage con- 
trol) is socially optimal;  but rather,  some intermediate  m will best pro- 
mote social welfare, optimally  balancing  the gains of a lower NAIRU 
against  the  loss from  slower  responses  to market  forces. 
Concern  for allocative  efficiency  has a number  of important  implica- 
tions for the design  of TIP. First, TIP should  be fully continuous,  rather 
than discontinuous.  Under a fully continuous TIP, any increment  of 
wages would raise the tax rate, and any decrement  would reduce  it. In 
contrast,  under the completely  discontinuous,  all-or-none  TIP, unless 
the firm  can go all the way to the target,  there  is no incentive  to go part 
way.  Moreover,  once the target  is reached,  there  is no incentive  to go fur- 
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under  such  a TIP, and  thus  the incentive  will be less effective  on the aver- 
age and  will cause a greater  distortion  of relative  wages.  By similar  rea- 
soning,  a partly  continuous  TIP is less desirable  than a fully continuous 
one. 
Second,  allocative  efficiency  would be affected  by the coverage  of TIP. 
If the pattern  of relative  wages  and  prices  were allocatively  efficient  with- 
out TIP, then to minimize  the distortion  of this pattern,  TIP should  exert 
comparable  downward  pressure  on all wage increases.  This would argue 
for broad coverage.  However,  if the pattern  of wages were regarded  as 
distorted  without  TIP, excluding  from TIP small firms  with low wages 
might  improve  allocative  efficiency,  as well as holding  down administra- 
tive cost and improving  equity. 
Allocative  efficiency  would  call for inclusion  of large  firms  in the pub- 
lic and nonprofit  sectors  as well as in the private  profit  sector.  The feasi- 
bility of such inclusion should therefore  be carefully  investigated.  For 
example,  federal  general  revenue  sharing  to state  and local governmental 
units  might  be varied  inversely  with the size of the wage increase. 
Third,  the method  of measuring  the wage increase  may affect  alloca- 
tive efficiency.  Perhaps  the most straightforward  method of computing 
the average  wage  level at any  firm  would  be to divide  total compensation 
by total man-hours.  As Wallich  and Weintraub  recognized  in their  orig- 
inal article,  this method  would enable a firm  to reduce  its average  wage 
(and hence reduce  its TIP penalty) by shifting  its labor skill mix from 
high-wage  to low-wage workers.  However, the incentive may not be 
strong.  The firm  must  weigh  a one-time  tax gain (in the year of the shift) 
against  a permanent  distortion  in its labor skill mix. If the firm main- 
tained  the new skill mix in subsequent  years,  it would receive  no further 
TIP benefit.  If it shifted  back to the original  skill mix, it would incur a 
TIP  loss, subsequently  offsetting  its initial  TIP gain. 
Furthermore,  some shift in the composition  of labor demand  toward 
low-skilled  workers  may  be socially  desirable.  An argument  can be made 
that  the wages  of these  workers  relative  to those  who are  highly  skilled  are 
too high  for allocative  efficiency  because  concern  for equity  tends  to nar- 
row the wage differential.'7  The result  is an excess supply  of low-skilled 
workers  at the same time as there is a shortage  of high-skilled  workers. 
Employment  programs  for low-skilled  persons try to induce employers 
to shift their skill mix. From this perspective,  it is possible that the in- 
17. J. R. Hicks, "Economic Foundation of  Wage Policy," Economic Journal, 
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centive  to shift  the mix of workers  under  TIP could  improve,  rather  than 
harm,  allocative  efficiency.'8 
If further  analysis  indicates  that  excessive  shifting  is likely,  one method 
to contain  it would  be to use a weighted  wage  index  such  as that  suggested 
by Wallich  and Weintraub.'9  Recently,  Weintraub  has suggested  an al- 
ternative  approach  of corrected-average-product.20  As this example  illus- 
trates,  implications  of the method of measuring  the wage increase  for 
allocative  efficiency  require  further  investigation. 
Another  aspect  of allocative  efficiency  that warrants  study  is the issue 
of whether  TIP will induce the substitution  of labor for capital, and of 
debt  for equity,  because  the tax penalty  is levied on the accounting  profit 
of the firm,  which  includes  returns  to equity  capital.  Only  if a firm  expects 
to grant  above-average  wage increases  would it have an incentive  to re- 
duce  its equity  capital.  Under  a penalty-reward  TIP, a firm  that  expects  to 
grant  below-average  wage increases  would have an incentive  to increase 
its equity  -capital.  If a firm  chose its capital-labor  and debt-equity  ratios 
based on long-run  considerations,  it may  be unaffected  if it assumes  that 
a penalty-reward  TIP will not affect  its average  tax rate  over  the planning 
period. In contrast,  a penalty-only  TIP would be expected  to raise the 
average  tax rate (assuming  the base rate remains  constant) and would 
therefore  presumably  reduce  equity  capital.  It appears  likely, therefore, 
that a penalty-reward  TIP would be less harmful  to allocative  efficiency 
in this respect  than a penalty-only  TIP. Concern  for allocative  efficiency 
therefore  calls for both penalty  and reward. 
In general, analysis  should attempt  to go beyond the detection of a 
possible  distortion  from  TIP to an estimate  of its magnitude.  Is the distor- 
tion of a penalty-reward  TIP likely to be large  relative  to the benefits  of 
such a policy? This assessment  should be an important  task for future 
research. 
INCOME  DISTRIBUTION 
Because  TIP provides  an  incentive  to reduce  wage  increases,  it is some- 
times suggested  that it will shift  the distribution  of income  from labor to 
capital.  As long as TIP does not alter  the growth  rate of the markup  of 
18. Laurence S. Seidman, The Design of Federal Employment Programs (Lex- 
ington, 1975), pp. 77-146. 
19. Wallich and Weintraub,  "Tax-Based  Incomes Policy." 
20. Weintraub,  Capitalism's  Inflation and Unemployment  Crisis, p. 128. 336  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
price  over standard  unit labor  cost (k), however,  the decline  in wage in- 
flation  caused  by TIP will be matched  (perhaps  after a short  lag) by an 
equal decline in price inflation.  There is no obvious reason why TIP 
should  alter  k, though  this warrants  careful  study. 
On the other  hand, TIP would  not "freeze"  the distribution  of income 
shares.  As noted earlier,  if k were nonzero,  the distribution  of income 
would  change  gradually  over time. For example,  suppose  that the degree 
of competition  in the economy  increases  over time, so that k is slightly 
negative.  The share  of labor  income  in national  income  will then  have an 
upward  secular  trend.  If TIP does not affect  this negative  value of k, it 
would  not alter  the secular  trend  in labor's  share. 
Even though  there  is no obvious  reason  why TIP should  reduce  labor's 
share of income, wage earners  and their union representatives  may re- 
main concerned  that the reduction  in price inflation  will not match the 
reduction  in wage  inflation.  Although  a tax incentive  for price  restraint  is 
administratively  infeasible,  two methods  of protecting  labor appear  feas- 
ible and  deserve  careful  consideration.  They are set forth  in the conclud- 
ing  section  below. 
Conclusions  and  Recommendations 
This paper  presents  an analysis  of alternative  tax-based  incomes  poli- 
cies. To summarize,  a TIP is a tax penalty,  a reward,  or a combination  of 
both that  provides  an incentive  to the employer  or employees  at each firm 
to reduce the firm's  own wage increase.  The microeconomic  impact of 
TIP is analyzed  in a value-maximization  model and in a collective  bar- 
gaining  model. A macromodel  consistent  with the micromodel  is then 
used  to analyze  the  impact  on the macroeconomy. 
A central  conclusion  is that a permanent  TIP should  permanently  re- 
duce  the NAIRU of the economy.  Rather  than  considering  TIP as a policy 
that seeks to reduce  the inflation  rate permanently,  even in the presence 
of excessive monetary  growth,  TIP should be viewed as a policy that 
attempts  to reduce permanently  the unemployment  rate at which the 
inflation  rate  will remain  constant.  The proper  average  growth  rate of the 
money  supply  would  be required,  over the longer  run,  to achieve  an aver- 
age  inflation  rate  near  zero.21  Thus,  TIP is fully compatible  with a flexible 
21. It might well be desirable to vary the money supply growth rate around its 
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monetary  view of inflation.  At the same  time, the wage view of inflation, 
which  holds that prices closely follow unit labor costs, is a key element 
of the  macromodel. 
The case has been made that the current  NAIRU is above the social 
optimum  and is economically  inefficient.  The institutional  features  and 
ethical  norms  of modem labor  markets  and  the income-maintenance  pro- 
grams  of the  welfare  state  have  raised  the  NAIRU so that,  when  the unem- 
ployment  rate is at the NAIRU, the value of leisure  or job search  to the 
marginal  unemployed  worker  is significantly  less than the value of his 
marginal  product.  Thus, policy should attempt  to reduce the NAIRU 
while preserving  the benefits  of modem labor markets  and the welfare 
state. 
A distinctive  feature  of TIP is that it attempts  to reduce  the NAIRU 
by a method  that  seeks  to maintain  the influence  of market  forces  on rela- 
tive wages and prices, thereby minimizing  the reduction  in allocative 
efficiency  and preserving  decentralized  wage and price decisionmaking. 
It therefore  appears  likely  that  the benefit  of reducing  the NAIRU by this 
method  will  exceed  the  cost  in allocative  efficiency. 
A major  objective  of this paper  is to compare  alternative  TIPs and to 
provide guidance for design. An important  implication  of the micro- 
analysis  is that  a continuous,  penalty-reward  employer  TIP, implemented 
through  the income tax of the firm, appears  most likely to succeed. In 
particular,  the penalty  is essential  to assure  a high probability  of effec- 
tiveness.  A reward-only  employer  TIP is likely  to be weaker  and  less reli- 
able. An employee  TIP is not likely to be an effective  substitute  for an 
employer  TIP. An employee TIP, however, implemented  through the 
withholding  system at each firm,  should reinforce  the impact of an em- 
ployer TIP and therefore  be a useful complement  to it. Allocative effi- 
ciency is impaired  least if both employer  and employee TIPs are fully 
continuous,  so that  any  reduction  in the wage  increase  reduces  the penalty 
or increases  the  reward. 
The following  design  for TIP is consistent  with the conclusions  of the 
analysis. It combines elements from the Wallich-Weintraub  employer 
TIP and the Okun employer-employee  incentive  package.  Currently  the 
U.S. average  annual  wage  increase  is 8 percent;  the average  trend  growth 
rate in labor productivity  is 2 percent;  and the basic inflation  rate is 6 
percent.  Suppose  that TIP set as its interim  targets  a wage inflation  rate 
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consist  of the following  two incentives.  The first  is an employer  incentive, 
in which  a firm  that  granted  a wage  increase  in excess of 6 percent  would 
receive  a surcharge  on its income tax for that year in proportion  to the 
size of the excess.  If it granted  less than  6 percent,  it would  receive  a pro- 
portionate  tax cut;  if it granted  6 percent,  its tax rate  would  remain  at the 
base (currently  48 percent for many corporations).  The second is an 
employee  incentive.  Employees  at a firm that granted  an average  wage 
increase  in excess of 6 percent  would  receive  a tax increase  for that year 
in proportion  to the size of the excess.  If the firm  granted  less than  6 per- 
cent, the employees  would receive a proportionate  tax cut; if it granted 
6 percent,  their  tax rate  would  remain  at the base. The penalty  or reward 
would  depend  only on the average wage  increase  at the firm  so that indi- 
vidual  promotions  would  not be discouraged. 
The employee  incentive  could  be implemented  through  the income  tax 
withholding  system,  and the reward  or penalty  would be reflected  in the 
actual  withholding  rate and  in take-home  pay, as described  above. 
Concern  for both allocative  efficiency  and equity  implies  that coverage 
should  be as broad  as administrative  and compliance  costs permit.  Small 
firms,  however,  should  have the option  of inclusion  in both, or exclusion 
from both. If feasible, the equivalent  of TIP should be applied to the 
nonprofit  sector  and  to state  and  local governments  (for example,  by vary- 
ing general  revenue  sharing  inversely  with the size of the wage  increase). 
For both incentives,  the tax surcharge  for exceeding  6 percent  must  be 
significant  but not prohibitive,  so that  when  market  forces  warrant  a rela- 
tive  wage  increase,  the firm  will still  find  it worthwhile  to exceed  6 percent, 
though  by less than it would have without  TIP. For example,  two firms 
that might  have granted  10 percent  and 6 percent,  respectively,  without 
TIP  might  grant  7 percent  and  5 percent  with  it. 
Because  TIP is an unprecedented  incentive,  there  is no reliable  method 
for  initially  estimating  the size of the  penalty  or reward  required  to achieve 
the  interim  target  of 6 percent.  Two  kinds  of information,  however,  should 
be useful in choosing  the initial size of the employer  TIP. First, data on 
the distribution  of wage increases  across  firms  should be examined.  For 
example,  given the current  mean of 8 percent,  what percentage  lies be- 
tween  6 percent  and 10 percent,  or 4 percent  and 12 percent?  Does the 
dispersion  vary  with the size of firms?  Second,  data  on the distribution  of 
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over time should  be examined.  Once again, do the dispersion  and fluc- 
tuation  vary with the size of firms?  Together,  these two kinds of data 
should  help suggest  the size of the penalty  that  would cause a significant, 
but bearable,  temporary  decline  in the after-tax  profit  rate for firms  that 
choose  to be in the upper  end of the distribution  of wage increases.  Once 
the initial sizes for both the employer  and the employee  TIP have been 
determined  and  put into effect  and  the actual  response  of firms  observed, 
the  sizes  could  be adjusted  appropriately. 
If these incentives,  together  with proper  monetary  and fiscal policies, 
succeed  in reducing  wage inflation  to 6 percent  and price inflation  to 4 
percent, the dividing  line between the penalty and reward should be 
gradually  reduced  (over several  years) to 2 percent,  the average  growth 
rate of labor  productivity.  As disinflation  steadily  occurs,  the unemploy- 
ment  rate  can gradually  be brought  down  to the new lower  NAIRU. With 
a permanent  TIP exerting  permanent  downward  pressure  on wage in- 
creases,  it should  be possible  to keep wage inflation  steady at close to 2 
percent  and price inflation  near 0 percent  if the unemployment  rate is 
kept equal to the new NAIRU. Experience  with TIP will tell whether  a 
NAIRU of perhaps  4 percent  could be achieved  with a TIP penalty  that 
is sufficiently  moderate  to allow relative wages and prices to respond 
to market  forces and guide  resources  efficiently. 
To maintain  the new  NAIRU and  price  stability,  the growth  rate  of the 
money  supply  prescribed  by monetarists  would  then  be essential,  on aver- 
age.  Periodic  disturbances  will continue  to move the economy  away  from 
its targets,  and countercyclical  policy will be necessary  to counter  these 
disturbances.  Nevertheless,  a permanent  TIP should  reduce  the frequency 
and  degree  of stagflation  in the  economy. 
Finally,  TIP should  have no significant  impact  on the secular  trend  in 
the distribution  of income between labor and capital. Although TIP is 
applied  only to wage increases,  price  inflation  should  decline as much as 
wage inflation.  This conclusion  does not depend on an assumption  of 
perfect  competition,  but only on the assumption  that TIP will not alter 
the degree  of competition,  or market  power,  in the economy. 
Nevertheless,  there  are at least two methods  of guaranteeing  protection 
for labor under  TIP that appear  feasible and deserve  serious  considera- 
tion.  Under  "real  wage  insurance,"  suggested  by Arthur  Okun,  if the  wage 
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provided  to wage and salary  workers.22  My suggestion  would be to link 
the tax rebate  to an employee  TIP, so that the tax cut is greatest  for em- 
ployees  who exercise  greatest  restraint.  A key aspect of the proposal  is 
that  the contingent  compensatory  tax cut must  be authorized  in advance, 
when  TIP itself is enacted,  so that protection  is guaranteed.  In addition, 
the rebate  could  be paid if wage inflation  declined  more than  price  infla- 
tion,  even  if the  wage  target  were  not met. 
Under  the second proposal,  suggested  by Lawrence  Klein and Vijaya 
Duggal,  if the wage target  were met but the ratio of after-tax  profits  to 
labor income  rose above some threshold  for the entire  corporate  sector 
(or economy), the base corporate  tax rate would be raised equally for 
all firms  to keep the ratio for the corporate  sector below the threshold 
for that year.23  The threshold  should reflect  both the secular  trend and 
the cyclical  behavior  of the ratio.  Once again,  a key aspect  is that  the cor- 
porate  tax rate adjustment  should  be enacted  in advance,  so that  protec- 
tion  is guaranteed. 
Other  feasible  methods  may be developed  to assure  that the distribu- 
tion of after-tax  income does not shift unfairly  because of TIP. A tax- 
based  incomes  policy, together  with such complementary  policies,  prom- 
ises significant  benefits  for labor,  business,  and the public, and therefore 
deserves  serious  consideration. 
APPENDIX 
The Myopic Profit-Maximization  Model 
and the Value-Maximization  Model 
THIS  APPENDIX  presents  the mathematics  of the myopic  profit-maximi- 
zation model and the value-maximization  model, which are described 
verbally  in the text. In both, the firm  is assumed  to be a monopsonistic 
competitor  in its labor market,  facing an upward-sloping  labor supply 
22. See Arthur Okun, "Incomes Inflation and the Policy Alternatives,"  in "The 
Economists'  Conference  on Inflation: Report,"  vol. 1 (1974; processed), pp. 365-75. 
23. Lawrence R. Klein and Vijaya Duggal, "Guidelines in Economic Stabiliza- 
tion: A New Consideration,"  Wharton  Quarterly,  vol. 6 (Summer 1971), pp. 20-24. Laurence  S. Seidman  341 
curve, and a monopolistic  competitor  in its product market,  facing a 
downward-sloping  product demand curve. It is assumed that current 
gross (before-tax)  profit  is a function  of w, the percentage  wage  increase 
(given  the wage  of the previous  period,  the choice of the wage of the cur- 
rent  period  can  be described  as the choice  of the percentage  wage  increase 
of the current  period); and  that  the function  has the following  properties: 
(A-1)  a=  _  (W  O) 
where 8 is a product  demand  parameter.  Terms that are not defined  in 
this appendix  are  defined  in the text. 
(A-2)  -  (w',6)  =  0, 
(A-3)  w2 < ? 
From  A-2 and  A-3, w' is the wage  increase  that  maximizes  gross  profit, 
as shown  in the diagram. 
The myopic  profit-maximization  model is as follows. 
Without  TIP, management  chooses the w that maximizes  current  net 
(after-tax)  profit  according  to the  following: 
(A-4)  wN(w) =  (1 -  b)irG(w), 
(A-5)  w=  (1-  b)  =  0. 
A-5 follows from A-4 because without  TIP, the tax rate b does not 
depend  on w. Management  will therefore  choose the w' that satisfies  A-2, 
as shown  in the  diagram. 
If a continuous  employer  TIP were  introduced,  the tax rate  t would  be: 
(A-6)  t(w) =  B +  mw. 
A-5 is therefore  modified  as follows: 
(A-5a)  w  _  (1-t)  d-r- 7_  G.m  =  0.  aw  a~w 
The difference  between  A-5a and  A-5 is the change  in Os/Ow  due to 
TIP, and  is called  the  TIP  incentive  effect: 
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At w' the optimum  without  TIP, using  A-2, A-5a becomes: 
(A-8)  k>  w ))  =  hX(  )*  ,  xGw)>O 
vl9W  /TI'P 
The value of 07N/&W  at w' measures  the incentive  provided  by TIP- 
penalty or reward-to  reduce w below w'. It depends  on m-the  TIP 
marginal  tax penalty-and  on  7G(w');  but not on  7rN(WI).  Because 
O7rN/Ow  is negative  at w', management  chooses  w" <  w' to satisfy  A-5a, 
as shown  in the diagram  presented  above. But it also chooses a smaller 
volume  of employment  because  it always  optimizes  at wage-employment 
combinations  on its (positively  sloped) labor  supply  curve. 
The value-maximization model is as follows: 
(A-9)  V  V(=rN,I), 
where 
V=  the value of the firm (present  value of current  and future net 
profit),  or the value of the income  stream  of management 
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(A-10)  I  =  (w),  dI/dw >  O. 
It should  be noted that because  I is defined  as a function  solely of w, 
it is independent  of 7rN. 
The  value  function  is assumed  to have  these  properties: 
(A-l1)  a  r  > 0?  dI >  ?' 
(A-12)  X-V/airN  dI  MRS  >  0.  0 V/alI  dir  V=constant 
The MRS  between  personnel  investment  and  current  net profit  is there- 
fore positive as defined  here (the negative  of the slope of the iso-value 
curve). 
(A-13)  aMRS <O 
A-13 is the income, or profit squeeze, effect. When 7rN  declines, the 
impact  of a specific  decrement  in I on V can  be offset  with a smaller  incre- 
ment in 7rT. For A-13 to hold, the elasticity  of the numerator  of A-12 
with respect  to TN  must  be less (more negative) than  the elasticity  of the 
denominator.  This  is shown  as follows. Substituting  A-12 into A-13 using 
the  quotient  rule  yields: 
(A-14)  aV  a(aV/larN)  _  av av/di <  0.  ai  arN  arN  ar 
Dividing  by (a  V/aI)  (a  V/aXN)  and multiplying  by TN yields: 
(A-15)  E7rN  <  Er, 
where 
E,,N  =  the elasticity  of the numerator  of A-12 with respect  to net profit 
EI =  the elasticity  of the denominator  of A-12 with respect  to net 
profit. 
(A-16)  ErN  =_  a/.  VV$3rNrV' 
(A-17)  Er  (  al)  =___ 
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The more negative is 0 (OV/7N  )  /10N  in A-1 6,  the more likely it is 
that A-15  and therefore A-1 3 will hold. For example, if 0 (OV/OI) /107N 
in A-17 were zero, establishing that 0(OV/OrN)/OrN  was negative would 
be sufficient  to establish  A-15 and therefore  A-13. The discussion  in the 
text concerning  the cost of capital  when V is the value  of the firm  and  the 
signals  of managerial  competence  when V is the value of management's 
own income  stream  provides  rationales  for why 0(OV/lOrN)/70rN  should 
be significantly  negative, thereby  increasing  the probability  that A-1  3 
holds. 
Management  chooses  w* such  that: 
(A-18)  aw  -  dNVgrN  OW  dI  d  . 
Dividing  through  by a V/aI yields: 
a7rN  dI  (A-19)  MRS.  + -  =  O.  9w  dw 
Thus, at the optimal  w*, because  both the MRS and dI/dw are posi- 
tive, OrN/OW  must be negative (not zero, as it is in the myopic  model), 
as shown  in the first  diagram  in this appendix.  It is important  to note that 
management  does not choose w* instead  of a smaller  wage increase  be- 
cause  it seeks  to attract  a larger  volume  of employment  and  produce  more 
output;  it chooses w* to invest in personnel  policy. Thus, the firm will 
choose a wage-employment  combination  above (to the left of) its labor 
supply  curve.  A reduction  in w below w*, therefore,  need not reduce  em- 
ployment. 
Consider  a particular  7rG(w,8) function such that when 8 decreases, 
07rG/Ow  and 0zrN/OW  are unaltered at each w. At  the lower  8 in A-19, 
07rN/OW  and dI/dw  are unaltered  at w*,  but MRS is greater  because 
7N(w*)  is less (from A-13).  Because the left side of A-19 is now negative 
at w*, OV/Ow  at w* is negative  in A-18. It would therefore  be optimal 
for management  to reduce  w below w* in response  to the decrease  in 8. 
This contrasts  with the myopic model, in which such a decrease  in 8 
would  not alter  the optimal  w (it would  remain  w' according  to A-2). 
The impact  of TIP on A-19 is as follows.  Under  a penalty  TIP, t(w*) 
is greater than b; because 7rG(w*)  is assumed to be unaltered, 7rN(w*) 
declines.  From  A-13, the MRS term  in A-i9  increases.  Because  0r"N/9w 
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A-19 negative,  and thus 0V/Ow negative at w*. In contrast,  under a 
reward  TIP, t(w*) is less than or equal  to b, so that the MRS stays con- 
stant  or decreases,  instead  of increasing.  The impact  of a penalty  TIP, in 
contrast  to a reward  TIP, on the MRS term is the profit-squeeze,  or in- 
come effect.  It is because a penalty  TIP should raise the MRS, while a 
reward  TIP should  not, that it is probable  that a penalty  TIP will make 
OV/Ow  more negative  at w*, and therefore  provide  a stronger  incentive 
to reduce  w below  w*. 
Both a penalty  and a reward  TIP affect TrN/lW  at w*, according  to 
A-7. For a penalty  TIP and a reward  TIP with the same m, the second 
term in A-7  is identical at w*  and tends to reduce OrN/Ow  (making it 
more negative,  thereby  raising  its absolute value). For a penalty TIP, 
b is less than t(w*),  and because O7rG/OW  is negative,  the first term is 
positive,  partly  offsetting  the second  term.  For a reward  TIP, the first  term 
is either zero or negative,  reinforcing  the second term. Thus, the TIP 
incentive  effect  is actually  somewhat  greater  for a reward  TIP than it is 
for a penalty  TIP at w* because  of the first  term  in A-7. Intuitively,  the 
lower tax rate at w* under a reward  TIP causes the increment  in 7rN to 
be greater  for a given  decrement  in w. 
The intuition  behind  the value-maximization  model, however,  is that 
the differential  impact  on the MRS due to the profit-squeeze,  or income 
effect, outweighs  the differential  substitution  effect. If so, a penalty  TIP 
would provide a stronger  incentive  at w* to reduce w, as shown in the 
diagram  below.  Moreover,  because  the firm  was operating  above  its labor 
supply  curve prior  to TIP, the lower w does not require  a reduction  in 
employment. 
Under  a penalty  TIP, management  chooses  w*  less than  w  to satisfy 
A-19. It will now be shown  that  the TIP multiplier  m can be set such  that 
w*  * will equal  the TIP target  n so that  in A-20, t(w* '"  )  equals  b: 
(A-20)  t(w) =  b +  m(w -  n),  n <  w*. 
If m can be so set, then a penalty  TIP would reduce  w below w* with- 
out causing an actual increase  in the tax rate, or an actual net profit 
squeeze  at  w*  *. 
If w equal to n is to be the new optimum,  w**, it must satisfy  A-19 
under  TIP. Without  TIP, at w equal to n the left side of A-19 would 
have  been positive,  since  it was optimal  to raise  w to w*. At w equal  to n, 
TIP would not affect  two of the three components  of A-19, MRS and Laurence S. Seidman  347 
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dIl/dw.  MRS(n) is unaffected  by TIP, regardless  of the value of m be- 
cause t(n)  equals b for all m, so that 7rN(n)  is independent of m. The 
only component  of A-19 that varies  with m is Orl'/Ow, according  to the 
expression  for OwN/Ow  given in A-5a. At w equal to n, 0(OrN/Ow)  /Om 
equals  -7rG(n),  so that %rN/Ow  varies  linearly  with  m; any  negative  value 
of OrN/Ow can be attained  by raising  m sufficiently. 
The m required  to make  w equals  n the new optimum  under  a penalty 
TIP is obtained  as follows. First, solve A-19 for the required  value of 
07rN/Ow  at w equals n, given MRS(n)  and dI/dw  at n, which are both 
independent  of m. Then the required  value of m can be obtained  by set- 
ting the expression  for Or/Ow in A-5a equal to the required  value of 
07rN/OW, and solving for m, given t equal to b, OrG/0w at n, and 7G(n). 
The new optimum,  w*  * equal  to n, is sustained  solely  by the TIP incen- 
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not alter  MRS(n)  or dI/dw  at n. Thus,  if m is set so that  A-19 is satisfied 
at w equal  to n, although  a net profit  squeeze  would  be threatened  at w*, 
none  would  occur  at the w*  * equal  to n that  results. 
This contrasts  with an increase  in the ordinary  income tax rate b. By 
raising  the MRS term in A-19, this would reduce w below w*. At the 
new optimum,  however,  the tax rate  would still be higher,  because  b does 
not vary  with  w, and  an actual  net profit  squeeze  is required  to sustain  the 
new  optimum. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Robert J. Gordon: Laurence  Seidman  has presented  a comprehensive 
and provocative  analysis  that attempts  to persuade  the reader  that adop- 
tion of an employer  TIP will reduce  the natural  (equilibrium)  unemploy- 
ment rate and, aided by an accommodative  monetary  deceleration,  will 
slow inflation  to a rate of less than 1.0 percent  in a relatively  short  time. 
Along the way, Seidman  argues  that an employer  TIP is to be preferred 
to an employee  TIP. Although  he claims  that a penalty-based  employer 
scheme  is a more potent  tool for wage deceleration  than a reward-based 
plan,  he nevertheless  endorses  a continuous  flat-rate,  tax-reward  schedule 
applying  both above and  below the short-term  wage guideline.  Seidman's 
cursory  review  of allocative  and  distribution  effects  reveals  no drawbacks 
sufficiently  important  to weaken  his support  of an employer  TIP. 
Several  issues  raised  in the paper  apply  not only to TIP, but equally  to 
any supply shift-whether  a positive shift caused by a crop failure, a 
payroll-tax  increase that raises the price at which firms are willing to 
supply  a given  output,  a negative  shift caused  by bumper  crops,  or a suc- 
cessful  TIP that  reduces  that  price.  First,  for a given  growth  rate  of nomi- 
nal income, a supply  shift changes  the division  of that spending  between 
growth  in real output  and price increases.  Bumper  crops or a successful 
TIP would  make  possible,  for any  given  growth  rate  of nominal  income,  a 
simultaneous  reduction  in the rate of inflation  and increase in growth 
of real output.  This, in turn,  would allow  the Federal  Reserve  to deceler- 
ate the rate  of monetary  growth  without  causing  a recession  or higher  un- 
employment.  In general,  any government-induced  price-reducing  supply 
shift-whether in the form of price  controls,  TIP, or a reduction  in pay- 
roll or excise  taxes-creates an environment  in which  monetary  decelera- 
tion is encouraged  and, therefore,  the administration  and Congress  in- 
directly  "gain  control"  over monetary  policy. 
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The principal  sources of inertia in the U.S. inflation  process, which 
make inflation  so difficult  to decelerate  and cause monetary  tightness  to 
be translated  into higher  unemployment  rather  than a slowdown  in infla- 
tion, are the institutions  of three-year  overlapping  wage contracts  in the 
unionized  part  of the economy  and  pattern-setting  and  emulation  in much 
of the remainder  of the economy. Before reading Seidman's  paper, I 
found it difficult  to understand  the workings  of an employer  TIP that 
imposes a tax increase on firms, including  those that are locked into 
existing  wage contracts  and those that have committed  themselves  to a 
given  increase  in wages  over  the  following  year.  I doubted  that  such  a pro- 
gram  could  reduce  the inflation  rate  except  by creating  a crisis  of business 
confidence  and  by increasing  the amount  of slack  in the economy.  Unfor- 
tunately  there is nothing  in Seidman's  paper to allay my suspicion  that 
the short-run  impact  of an employer  TIP may be perverse. 
While Seidman  includes a collective-bargaining  model, his primary 
analytical  focus is on nonunion  wage determination  where the firm sets 
its own  wage  increase  unilaterally  to maximize  its own net profit  or utility. 
This is an important  shortcoming  of the paper.  More convincing  is the 
analytical  framework  in Rees' paper  at this conference,  which views the 
rate  of wage  change  as the outcome  of a clash  between  the differing  inter- 
ests of firms  and workers,  with a reconciliation  brought  about in many 
cases by strikes or by the threat of strikes. Seidman's  myopic profit- 
maximizing  model, in which TIP tilts the net profit  schedule,  presents  a 
one-sided  wage decision,  not a two-sided  wage bargain.  Many  firms  can- 
not limit the wage increase  to that which maximizes  net profit  because 
they  face the threat  of strikes  as workers  try  to maximize  their  own utility. 
As Rees points out, TIP may increase  the likelihood of strikes as em- 
ployer pressure  for small wage increases stands against the desires of 
workers,  who have no such tax incentive  to settle for less. 
Seidman's  second, value-maximizing  model makes the size of wage 
increases  depend  on the size of employer  net profits.  Thus, the empirical 
tests of the effect  of net profits  on wage behavior  in U.S. time series  data 
form an important  part of Seidman's  case for an employer  TIP. If Seid- 
man  is right,  the squeeze  on net profits  caused  by higher  corporate  taxes 
levied on firms  through  an employer  TIP will lead to lower wage settle- 
ments  as workers  react  to the profit  squeeze.  If Seidman  is wrong,  and  net 
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Table  1. Coefficients  on Detrended  Net Profits  in Alternative  Wage  Equations 
Dependent  variablea 
Average  hourly  Compensation 
earnings  per man-hour 
Sample  description  (1)  (2) 
Period 1955:2-1975:2 
1. Seidman  specification  0.0103  0.0177 
(2.29)  (2.06) 
2. Lagged  wage replaced  with lagged  price  0.0011  0.0094 
(0.22)  (1.13) 
Period 1954:1-1976:4 
3. Seidman  specification  0.0029  0.0067 
(0.75)  (0.92) 
4. Lagged  wage replaced  with lagged price  -0.0067  0.0026 
(-1.65)  (0.39) 
5. Social security  tax, personal  income  tax, 
minimum  wage, and control dummy  variables 
added  to 3, using lagged  wage  -0.0073  0.0007 
(-1.33)  (0.07) 
6. Same as 5, using lagged price  -0.0152  -0.0061 
(-2.68)  (-0.60) 
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and author's estimates. 
a.  Sum of coefficients  on detrended ratio of net profits to corporate  product. Numbers in parentheses  are 
t statistics. The dependent variable is in the forn  of a one-quarter  rate of change. 
nario  is that firms  will attempt  to shift forward  the burden  of the higher 
corporate  taxes  in the form  of price  increases. 
For the purposes  of discussion,  I have  prepared  table 1, which  presents 
the coefficient  on net profits (measured  as the detrended  ratio of cor- 
porate  profits  after  tax to gross  corporate  product) in a number  of differ- 
ent wage  equations.  Column  1 presents  results  for equations  in which  the 
quarterly  change  in the average  hourly  earnings  index of the Bureau  of 
Labor  Statistics  is the dependent  variable,  and column  2 presents  results 
in which  the dependent  variable  is the quarterly  change  in compensation 
per  man-hour. 
Only  in the first  line, for both wage  variables  in columns  1 and  2, is the 
coefficient  on net profits  significantly  positive.  In all other  variants  of the 
wage equations  the coefficient  on net profits  is either  insignificant  or sig- 
nificantly  negative.  In line 2, Seidman's  sample  period  is retained,  but his 
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3, the sample  period is extended  slightly;  in line 4, the lagged wage is 
again  replaced  by the lagged  price. In lines 5 and 6 additional  indepen- 
dent  variables  are  included  that  have  proved  to be important  in my recent 
research  on wage  behavior,  including  changes  in the effective  social secu- 
rity  tax  rate,  the effective  personal  income  tax rate,  the effective  minimum 
wage, and dummy  variables  for the period  of price and wage controls  in 
the early 1970s. 
Thus, Seidman's  empirical  conclusion  that a net profit squeeze con- 
tributes  to a wage deceleration  does not appear  to be robust.  On the other 
hand, in experiments  that add a corporate  tax variable  to a price equa- 
tion, there is no conclusive  evidence  supporting  forward  shifting  of the 
corporate  tax. Although  my empirical  results  do not suggest  that an em- 
ployer  TIP will have any beneficial  income effect  to reinforce  its substi- 
tution  effect,  there  is no strong  case  to be made  that  it will have an adverse 
income  effect. 
While I am skeptical  that an employer  TIP will have a beneficial  im- 
pact,  I am more  sympathetic  to the idea of an employee  TIP. As Seidman 
points out, an employee  penalty  creates  conflicting  income and substitu- 
tion effects,  with the possibility  that the loss of income caused  by a tax 
penalty may lead to higher  rather  than lower wage demands.  But this 
cannot  be an argument  for favoring  an employer  TIP because  the same 
possibility  of an adverse  income  effect  exists  for an employer  tempted  to 
shift  forward  the tax penalty  to recoup  lost net profits.  Instead,  the major 
weakness  of the employee  TIP is the problem  raised earlier of inertia 
due to multiyear  wage contracts  and pattern  setting. Equity problems 
arise  when TIP penalties  are levied on unions that are locked into pre- 
negotiated  contracts  that call for wage increases  at rates  higher  than the 
TIP  guideline. 
Because  Seidman  ignores  the inertia  phenomenon,  his numerical  sim- 
ulations  of the effect  of TIP are overly  optimistic.  Policymakers  following 
Seidman  would be likely to set the TIP no-penalty  guideline  too low 
initially,  ignoring  the large number  of workers  who would receive  wage 
increases  exceeding the guideline and who would thus pay a penalty 
(directly  in an employee TIP or indirectly  in the case of an employer 
TIP). If policymakers  are surprised  by TIP's lack of effectiveness,  they 
will be equally  stunned  by a substantial  increase  of tax revenue  that will 
have a deflationary  effect on the economy. Thus, far from achieving  a 
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Seidman,  TIP could actually  have the opposite  effect  and increase  unem- 
ployment. 
Finally,  Seidman  is entirely  too sanguine  about  the lack of impact  of a 
wage-only  TIP on the income distribution,  due to the alleged lock-step 
correlation  between  prices and wages. My past work has indicated  that 
price  change  responds  to wage change  with a substantial  lag. The short- 
run  impact  of a wage deceleration  would be to limit labor's  share  of the 
income  distribution.  The wage  deceleration  of the early 1960s in response 
to slack labor markets,  together  with wage guidelines,  helps to explain 
why  the share  of profits  in the gross  national  product  was so high in 1964 
and 1965. And the British  experience  with voluntary  incomes policy in 
the past few years  has indicated  that prices  follow wages  with a lag suffi- 
ciently  long to cause a squeeze  on labor's  share that lasts for a year or 
more. Because labor unions are familiar  with this historical  experience, 
they are likely to fight hard against  the adoption  of a TIP scheme that 
applies  only  to wages. 
Arthur  M. Okun: Laurence  Seidman  provides  much  microeconomic  and 
macroeconomic  insight  into the way alternative  TIP plans could work. I 
agree  with most of his analysis,  but I have some important  reservations 
and so I would like to summarize  his argument,  indicating  where I see 
things  differently. 
As a point of departure,  Seidman  considers  a representative  nonunion 
firm facing a standard  maximization  problem  with respect to its labor 
market.  Operating  in a search  labor market,  it faces a positively  sloped 
supply  curve  of labor  and  has some  wage  discretion.  When  a penalty  TIP 
-an  extra  tax on the wage  increase-is  imposed,  the firm  finds  it optimal 
to settle  for a smaller  wage  increment.  But in those circumstances,  a pen- 
alty TIP simply  moves the firm  to the left on the supply curve of labor 
facing it. The firm, as a result, opts for a lower level of employment  as 
well as a lower wage rate. Also implied  are a lower level of output and 
a forward  shifting  of the TIP penalty  into product  prices.  In that world, 
TIP is not distinctly  disinflationary;  it is contractionary. 
To justify an employer  TIP, Seidman  must leave that world and in- 
clude "employee  satisfaction"  as a consideration  in the firm's value 
maximization,  which adjusts  the short-term  measured  profit of the firm 
by adding  the present  value of its incremental  personnel  investment.  The 
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down its wage,  it may sacrifice  valuable  morale,  which may meain  lower 
current  productivity  or higher  future  quit rates.  Any firm  for which  per- 
sonnel  investment  is important  will operate  off its labor supply  curve  in 
a weak  labor  market.  And therefore  when  it is induced  by a penalty  TIP 
to hold down wages, it does not cut employment.  Moreover,  so long as 
the firm  can expand  output  by hiring  one more available  applicanit  at the 
same  wage, the last unit of output  that was a zero-profit  unit before  TIP 
incurs  no extra  tax and remains  a zero-profit  unit after the introduction 
of TIP. And hence there  is no reason  to expect a forward  shifting  of the 
TIP penalty;  lower wage hikes mean lower price hikes. Hence, the em- 
ployer TIP is distinctly  disinflationary  and not contractionary  in that 
world. 
I fully share  Seidman's  view that the value-maximization  model is the 
right  model  for the world  we live in. Unlike  the myopic  model,  it explains 
why firms  allow quit rates to fall in a slack labor market  without  slow- 
ing or cutting  wages, and why firms  raise their  wages even when appli- 
cants  are  abundant  at the existing  wage.  Indeed,  any  time a nonunion  firm 
raises  its wage when it has layoffs or a no-help-wanted  sign, it must be 
deliberately  operating  inside (to the left of)  its short-run  labor supply 
curve.  Clearly,  most firms  during  a slump  consciously  "over-pay"  labor 
relative  to the wage  required  merely  to evoke the number  of workers  they 
want. 
Seidman  stresses  another  and quite  separate  implication  of the model, 
namely,  the role of high  profits  in stimulating  wage  increases.  He invokes 
a diminishing  marginal  rate of substitution  between currently  measured 
profits  and present  value of incremental  personnel  investment.  His intui- 
tion on that  score  seems  plausible  to me: capital  markets  cannot  fully ap- 
praise  the value  of the personnel  investment;  and  when  current  profits  are 
very  low, the value of long-run  investments  in personnel  or anything  else 
becomes questionable.  That implies that the higher  the level of current 
profits,  the more  the firm  should  focus on its long-run  investment  in per- 
sonnel, and hence the higher  the wage it should  be willing  to pay, other 
things  being  equal. 
Seidman  stresses  this point as one rationale  for preferring  a penalty 
TIP to a reward  TIP on wages.  But actually  it is an argument  for a higher 
tax rate on corporate  income. That higher rate comes back to haunt 
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their  pricing  on the basis  of after-tax  returns  and,  in that  case, would  pass 
through  the TIP surcharge  into higher  prices. Of course, a penalty  TIP 
need not entail a higher  average  corporate  tax rate: one could estimate 
the likely TIP revenues,  lower the basic corporate  rate, and thus keep 
total expected  revenues  constant.  In that case, the favorable  "income  ef- 
fect"  on wages  is lost, but the danger  of forward  shifting  of the corporate 
tax is avoided.  Because  of his strong  emphasis  on the income  effect,  Seid- 
man  would  not make that trade.  As a matter  of judgment,  it looks like a 
good  trade  to me. 
While  the TIP surcharge  will not enter  into the marginal  cost of output 
for any firm with excess job applicants,  it does have a flaw previously 
noted  by Richard  Slitor.  It imposes  different  marginal  incentive  effects  on 
firms  with a high  ratio  of profits  to wages  as compared  to firms  with  a low 
ratio,  reflecting  either  differences  in labor  intensity  or profitability  of their 
capital.  As Slitor  suggests,  that defect can be avoided  by depriving  firms 
of full deductibility  of their  payrolls  as expenses  if they  exceed  the hurdle 
wage  increase  in a penalty  TIP. But Slitor's  alternative  places the entire 
penalty  into the marginal  cost of output,  and  that  would  be an even more 
serious  defect in my judgment.  Ideally, any deductibility  penalty  should 
be based on the employment  of last year so that increased  employment 
would  not enlarge  the penalty.  But that  clearly  creates  greater  administra- 
tive  complexity. 
When Seidman  develops  the macroeconomics  of the TIP system, he 
describes  briefly  the way TIP could be used to disinflate  an economy 
that had reached its nonaccelerating-inflation  rate of  unemployment 
(NAIRU) with a high inflation  rate. The TIP and the adjustments  of 
monetary  growth  can lower the inflation  rate  without  incurring  the enor- 
mous output  losses that Perry  underlines  in his paper.  Seidman  stresses 
in greater  detail  that TIP can lower the NAIRU, backing  his claim with 
an ingenious  juggling act of adjusting  the TIP penalty and monetary 
growth  to neutralize  the first-round  effect of each successive  movement 
into  territory  that  would  otherwise  accelerate  the inflation  rate. 
Of the two predicted  consequences  of TIP, disinflating  at a given 
NAIRU and  lowering  NAIRU, I feel more  enthusiastic  about  the former. 
The interest  in TIP and other cures  for stagflation  that created  this con- 
ference was triggered  by the stubbornness  of the inflation  rate at high 
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through  TIP-works  in any plausible  model of the NAIRU type. Seid- 
man has convinced  me that he is right  in principle.  But any substantial 
shift  might  require  a very  costly  reward  or a penalty  so high  that  it would 
be nearly  prohibitive,  like controls.  The nonlinearity  of the short-term 
Phillips  curve  points to this danger.  Furthermore,  the markup  of prices 
over  wages  may  become  significantly  wider  at high  utilization  rates;  then, 
the TIP incentive  must  be strong  enough  to push down (and keep hold- 
ing down) real wages  to lower  the NAIRU. The emphasis  on disinflation 
points to TIP as a transitional  remedy,  while the emphasis  on lowering 
NAIRU frames  it as permanent.  Operationally,  however,  I submit  that 
this is a red herring.  Any advocate  of TIP should ask the Congress  to 
recognize  TIP as experimental  and to legislate  it for a trial period of a 
few  years. 
Let me conclude  with a few comments  on reward  and  penalty  variants 
of TIP. For policy purposes,  one should simply  forget  the logical possi- 
bility  that Seidman  records  of giving  rewards  to employers  for especially 
small wage increases  and imposing  penalties  on workers  based on the 
average  wage increase  paid by their  firms.  Such  proposals  would  fail any 
reasonable  test of equity  in the political  process.  Henry  Wallich  has ar- 
ticulately  defended  the evenhandedness  of his proposal  by emphasizing 
that the penalty  is on the employer,  even though  the tax is on excessive 
wage increases.  Penalizing  workers  or rewarding  firms  on wages would 
remove  any semblance  of evenhandedness.  Wage  penalties  must be im- 
posed on firms,  and wage rewards  must  be given (and made universally 
available)  to workers. 
Seidman  loads the dice against  the reward  approach  in a number  of 
ways.  The most obvious  example  of that is his use of the assumption  that 
any worker  accepting  a wage-restraint  reward  would expect an equiva- 
lently  lower (before-tax)  wage level for the remainder  of his career  with 
a firm. I find that entire analysis totally unpersuasive.  It claims that 
workers  will shift to jobs that offer  lower current  take-home  pay on the 
conviction  that  the before-tax  level of wages  is the best  predictor  of future 
after-tax  wages.  Workers  must  be more sensible  than that!  Furthermore, 
Seidman  ignores  two advantages  of rewards-that they cannot  raise  mar- 
ginal costs and that they avoid the forward  shifting  and labor-intensity 
problem.  Finally, he does not take seriously  the evidence  of a lag from 
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first  year a penalty-TIP  would  redistribute  income  from  wages  to profits. 
A reward-TIP  would  compensate  for that  on an after-tax  basis. 
Laurence  Seidman: Gordon's  profit  variable  gives  mixed  results  in alter- 
native  wage equations,  in contrast  to the highly significant  performance 
of my  profit  variable  in table 1. His profit  variable  does obtain  a t statistic 
just above two in a wage equation  with the same right-hand  variables 
that  I used ("Seidman  specification"),  though  his t value  is less than  mine 
(just above  four). The performance  of Gordon's  profit  variable  generally 
deteriorates  as he varies  the specification  of the wage equation. 
Part of the contrast  may result  from the fact that Gordon and I test 
different  profit  variables.  If this is correct,  then it becomes  important  to 
assess  the theoretical  plausibility  of each profit  variable. 
My variable  is the ratio of the after-tax  profit  rate on equity  in manu- 
facturing  to its trend  value. It focuses  on the detrended  level of after-tax 
profit  relative  to stockholders'  equity.  The choice of this profit  variable 
rests on the hypothesis  that it is the rate of return  on equity (relative  to 
the rate regarded  as "normal")  that is important  to a board  of directors 
and stockholders,  and therefore to  management.  The profit rate on 
equity  is a widely  quoted  measure  of the performance  both of a firm  and 
of its management.  In a collective  bargaining  context,  the union  may also 
focus on it as the best indicator  of the firm's  "ability  to pay." 
Gordon's  variable  is the detrended  ratio  of the share  of after-tax  profits 
in value added for the entire corporate  sector. The numerator  is the 
rate of after-tax  profits  to gross  product  originating  (value added). It is 
not clear to me why a board of directors  or stockholders,  and therefore 
management,  should  be concerned  about  the ratio of after-tax  profits  to 
value added,  rather  than to equity.  Even unions  may be more interested 
in rates  of return  on equity. 
In sum,  a fair  test of the role of profits  in wage determination  requires  a 
theoretically  plausible  profit  variable  and the specification  of the wage 
equation.  Gordon's  mixed  results  underline  the need for further  research. 
They do not, however,  change my current  view that the profit rate on 
equity  relative  to trend appears  to influence  wage inflation;  or my con- 
clusion  that econometric  evidence  appears  to provide  some support  for 
the belief  that  an employer  penalty  TIP is likely  to provide  a stronger  and 
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General  Discussion 
Several  discussants  were concerned  about  the allocative  consequences 
of the TIP plan. Martin  Baily mentioned  distortions  that could be intro- 
duced by uniform  across-the-board  guidelines.  Recognizing  the admin- 
istrative  problems,  he nonetheless  saw the need for flexible rules and 
special  exceptions  that  would  take  account  of differing  supply  and  demand 
conditions  among  industries.  Bruce  MacLaury  suggested  that  some  varia- 
tion across  firms  might  be permitted  by gearing  the penalty  on excessive 
wage increases  to a firm's  historical  performance  on wages over several 
years  rather  than  to a uniform  percentage  guideline  on wage  increases. 
Frederic  Mishkin  suggested  that  Seidman's  scheme  might  punish  rapidly 
expanding  firms  unduly,  because  he thought  they  would  be likely to have 
above-average  rates  of wage increase.  James  Tobin said that firms  would 
still be free to grow  rapidly  and  to pay higher  relative  wages  under  a TIP 
plan;  if they chose to do so, they would simply  have to pay higher  taxes 
for a limited  period  during  which  they  raised  their  relative  wage.  Edmund 
Phelps  was concerned  that, if the penalty  was only a one-time  tax on a 
permanent  move  to a higher  wage  level, as Tobin  implied,  the TIP penalty 
might  not be an effective  incentive  to hold wages  down.  George  von Fur- 
stenberg  saw other  implications  of the one-time  character  of the penalty. 
For example,  it treated  rapidly  growing  firms  least unfavorably  if they 
raised  their relative  wage most when they were small and thus still had 
small  profits  subject  to the  penalty  tax  rate. 
Michael  Wachter  stressed  the importance  of the internal  labor  market 
that  firms  use for  promotions  and  upgrading;  he thought  that  any  TIP plan 
might  distort  the workings  of that market  and thus cause a serious in- 
efficiency.  Thomas Juster  was concerned  that, under TIP, unmeasured 
fringe  benefits-including loafing  on the job-would  become  more  attrac- 
tive. Sidney  Weintraub  was not persuaded  that some of these predicted 
changes  would occur  to any significant  degree,  or that all of them  would 
necessarily  be distortions  if they did occur. In any case, he emphasized, 
it was worthwhile  accepting  some microeconomic  allocative  inefficiency 
to correct  the massive  allocative  inefficiency  of unemployed  resources. 
Robert  Hall contended  that Seidman's  externality  argument  assumed 
that the social cost of inflation  was huge. That was a fundamental  issue Laurence  S. Seidman  359 
that  was  not clearly  demonstrated  by theory  or empirical  evidence.  James 
Duesenberry  countered  that, although  the costs of inflation  may not be 
clear,  it was clear  that the costs of attempting  to reduce  inflation  through 
restraint  of aggregate  demand  were  extremely  large. 
Duesenberry  suggested  that, to be effective,  a TIP plan had to supple- 
ment a basic consensus in which the majority  of  citizens committed 
themselves  to reduce  inflation  through  a cooperative  effort.  Under those 
circumstances,  which are required  for any incomes  policy, a penalty  TIP 
would  help by punishing  the minority  of holdouts and by coordinating 
the actions  of those in the consensus.  Michael  Wachter  commented  that 
a minority  of holdouts  might  undermine  the effectiveness  of any  plan.  He 
expected  many holdouts, especially among people who felt that their 
incomes  had lagged behind and that they therefore  deserved  an oppor- 
tunity  to catch  up. 
In line with Duesenberry's  view of a penalty  TIP as a "convincer," 
Arnold  Packer  suggested  more  generally  that  the line between  persuasion, 
on the one hand, and TIP, on the other, was not so sharp as Seidman 
implied.  People in social situations  generally  respond  to persuasion  and 
unenforced  rules.  The effectiveness  of rewards  and penalties  under  TIP 
would  depend  on whether  or not people accept  the reasonableness  of the 
system  and  expect  others  to do so, too. 
Another  portion  of the discussion  examined  the short-run  and  long-run 
potentialities  of tax-based  incomes policy. Was it to be viewed mainly 
as a device  to effect  a transition  to a lower  inflation  rate  or as one to lower 
the nonaccelerating-inflation  rate of unemployment  (NAIRU)  perma- 
nently? Wachter was unpersuaded  by  Seidman's argument that the 
NAIRU would be actually  reduced.  He did not see how TIP would re- 
duce the size of the pool of unemployed  required  to keep labor markets 
in balance.  Wachter  thought  such a shift had to involve some change  in 
relative  wage  patterns  (including  the relative  return  from  wages  and  trans- 
fer payments)  or some improvement  in the efficiency  of labor markets. 
Basically,  the issue required  a general  equilibrium  analysis,  which Seid- 
man had not provided.  Similarly,  Benjamin  Friedman  questioned  how 
TIP could  have a beneficial  transitional  effect  without  lowering  the natu- 
ral rate of unemployment.  In response, Arthur Okun pointed to the 
explicit  assumption  in Seidman's  model that the ratio of prices to stan- 
dard  unit labor costs was not raised  by high utilization  rates. That as- 
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cantly with a penalty of reasonable  size. But it was not crucial to the 
transitional  benefits. 
Franco  Modigliani  felt strongly  that any TIP should  be terminated  as 
soon as the inflation  rate wound down, even if the program  in fact was 
capable  of lowering  the natural  rate of unemployment.  He feared  that a 
permanent  TIP would  have serious  distorting  effects.  On the other  hand, 
Phelps  argued  that,  since  the natural  rate  of unemployment  was  not neces- 
sarily  socially  optimal,  a permanent  tax to lower  it might  well be justified 
on efficiency  grounds.  Seidman  urged  Modigliani  to weigh  the permanent 
gains from a lower natural  unemployment  rate against  any permanent 
distortionary  costs. Weintraub  commented  that  both the analysis  in Seid- 
man's  paper and the discussion  of it by the participants  leaned heavily 
on the natural-rate  view-an  equilibrium  concept  that  Weintraub  felt had 
little  relevance. 
Albert  Rees agreed  and  extended  Gordon's  reservation  about  the mod- 
eling  of TIP in the context  of a nonunion  employer  maximizing  an objec- 
tive function.  Collective  bargaining  would  be the dominant  mode of wage 
determination  for the class of firms  that would be covered  by a penalty 
TIP plan. Rees felt that the original  Wallich-Weintraub  paper,  although 
less elegant than Seidman's,  had presented  a preferable  model that al- 
lowed them  to come to grips  with wage determination  among  large  firms 
and unions. Weintraub  expressed  another  reservation  about the single- 
firm  microeconomic  analysis;  he thought  that the general  increase  in the 
money  wage should  be viewed  as determined  by the whole system  rather 
than  by the  functions  of a single  representative  firm. 
Particular  issues about the design of a TIP plan evoked some com- 
ments.  Martin  Feldstein  supported  the view  that,  because  TIP was experi- 
mental,  it should  be regarded  as temporary;  hence he preferred  penalties 
to rewards  because it was much less difficult  politically  to terminate  a 
penalty.  John Shoven  felt that the corporate  tax rate was a poor instru- 
ment  for a penalty  TIP designed  to moderate  wage increases  because  ra- 
tios of total wages to profits  differ  so widely among  firms.  The punish- 
ments  for large  wage increases  would depend  on those ratios  and would 
not correspond  to the seriousness  of the violation. 
George  von Furstenberg  noted the possibility  of a perverse  effect on 
prices  from a penalty  TIP on wages.  For a monopolistic  firm  engaged  in 
short-run  profit  maximization  and  facing  an upward-sloping  labor  supply 
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Under  these  conditions,  the TIP penalty  would curtail  the supply  of out- 
put and  thus  actually  raise  prices.  He noted  that  Okun  had  made  a similar 
point in his comments,  and that Seidman  had conceded  it in the paper. 
Unlike them, however, he was not ready to  dismiss that model as 
irrelevant. 
Some participants  probed  the distributional  impact  of Seidman's  TIP 
plan. Weintraub  doubted  that any shift  to profits  would  be quantitatively 
significant,  even in the initial  year  of the program.  A small shift  might  be 
acceptable,  particularly  if the  program  included  some  type  of excess  profits 
tax. Seidman  elaborated  on his specific  proposals  for insuring  fairness  to 
workers.  Duesenberry  suggested  that a penalty  TIP might  be made  more 
equitable  and more acceptable  to workers  by simultaneously  enacting  a 
cut in income or payroll taxes that directly  benefited  wage and salary 
earners. 